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ABSTRACT 
With cyber attacks on the rise, cyber defenders require new, innovative solutions 
to provide network protection. We propose a spectral graph-based cyber detection and 
classification (SGCDC) system using phantom components, the strong node concept, and 
the dual-degree matrix to detect, classify, and respond to worm and distributed 
denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. The system is analyzed using absorbing Markov chains 
and a novel Levy-impulse model that characterizes network SYN traffic to determine the 
theoretical false-alarm rates of the system. The detection mechanism is analyzed in the 
face of network noise and congestion using Weyl’s theorem, the Davis-Kahan 
theorem, and a novel application of the n-dimensional Euclidean metric. The SGCDC 
system is validated using real-world and synthetic datasets, including the WannaCry 
and Blaster worms and a SYN flood attack. The system accurately detected and 
classified the attacks in all but one case studied. The known attacking nodes were 
identified in less than 0.27 sec for the DDoS attack, and the worm-infected nodes 
were identified in less than one second after the second infected node began the target 
search and discovery process for the WannaCry and Blaster worm attacks. The system 
also produced a false-alarm rate of less than 0.005 under a scenario. These results 
improve upon other non-spectral graph systems that have detection rates of less than 
0.97 and false alarm rates as high as 0.095 for worm and DDoS attacks. 
v 
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Despite continuous efforts to improve cybersecurity [1], cyberspace remains a vulnerable
domain to a variety of attacks. In 2017, over 200,00 hosts across 150 countries experienced
the devastating effects of the WannaCry ransomware cryptoworm [2]. In 2018, 4,800 web-
sites were compromised each month by formjacking attacks, ransomware attacks increased
by 12 percent, supply chain attacks increased by 78 percent, over 70 million cyber records
were stolen from simple storage service buckets, phishing attacks continued to increase,
and an increase was observed in extortion cases through cryptocurrency [3], [4]. In 2019,
there were 7.2 billion malware attacks [5], successful phishing attacks increased by 25
percent [6], and cryptocurrency attacks increased by 29 percent in the first quarter alone [7].
Yet, in the face of a growing attack environment, the number of internally detected com-
promises continues to decrease, primarily because cyber attackers have an advantage over
cyber defenders [4], [8]. Cyber attackers maintain the upper hand by controlling not only
the target of the attack, but also the timing, tempo, and methodologies employed. Cyber
defenders are left with the impossible task of predicting all potential attack vectors in an
effort to proactively defend their network [9].
Seeking innovative solutions to shift the status quo toward or in favor of the cyber defender,
we turned to biomimicry, the formal study of nature to develop technological or engineering
solutions [10]. We examined biological defense mechanisms for relevant approaches and
strategies because several similarities exist between the cyber and biological attack-defense
domains [11], [12]. Since we live in a current environment where cyber attackers cannot be
eradicated, the biological immune system stood out due to its principle of restoring balance
in the attack-defense domain through immunity instead of eradication of a threat [11].
The vertebrate biological immune system is responsible for quickly and efficiently detecting,
identifying, and eliminating various harmful pathogens in an animal including viruses,
bacteria, and parasites. It is composed of an innate and an adaptive immune system. The
innate immune system is responsible for detecting the harmful pathogens and signaling
their presence to the adaptive immune system. The adaptive immune system is responsible
for choosing and employing the correct immune response [13], as shown in Figure 1.1.
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Figure 1.1. Subsystems of the biological immune system. Adapted from [11]
and [13].
Working together, the subsystems perform four critical functions to enable immunity within
an animal. First, the immune system recognizes the intruder through antibodies and immune
cell receptors distributed throughout the body. Then, either an antibody binds to the pathogen
to neutralize the antigen or a T cell kills the host cell. In either case, the pathogen is unable
to further replicate. Next, the system learns to create and produce antibodies and T cell
receptors that can quickly recognize that specific pathogen in the future in order to generate
a quicker response. Finally, the system stimulates the reproduction of the immune cells
and receptors that best match known pathogens in the memory of the system. As a result,
the system contains the following critical properties: recognition of intruders, elimination
or neutralization of intruders, ability to learn, ability to distinguish self from non-self,
and system memory [14]. With the biological immune system in mind, we seek a path to
implement the critical properties of the adaptive immune system in a cyber defensive system
using spectral graph theory-based techniques.
1.1 Objective
The objective of this work is the development of a spectral graph-based cyber detection
and classification (SGCDC) system capable of implementing the critical functions of the
adaptive immune system against malicious worm and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS)
attacks using spectral graph theory tools like phantom components, the strong node concept,
and the dual-degree matrix. As depicted in Figure 1.2, the proposed system uses historical
attack patterns coupled with real-time network traffic to detect malicious attack behaviors
and trigger quick, specific countermeasures, just as the biological immune system uses
information from the innate immune system coupledwith the existence of a harmfulmicrobe
to trigger a quick, specific response. Accordingly, the proposed system must implement
2
components that identify, classify, and provide responsive actions against worm and DDoS
attacks in real time using spectral graph theory tools and analysis.
Figure 1.2. Biological immune system-inspired cyber defense system.
The objective of our approach stems from a comprehensive review of the literature, which
indicated that four components are critical in developing a cyber system that mimics the
biological immune system: behavior sensing, immunological memory, adaptive pattern
recognition, and response [15]. The five processes of our design approach, depicted in
Figure 1.3, align with these four critical components and provide the initial framework for
developing the overall solution presented in Chapter 3. Specifically, the design approach
makes use of a traffic dispersion graph (TDG) to performnetwork behavior sensing, phantom
components to store behavioral characteristics of historical attacks, the strong node concept
to recognize and detect the attack behavior, a dual-degree matrix to classify the detected
attack behavior, and network countermeasures to perform response. The system proposed
in this design approach is possible because each type (or category) of cyber attack has
distinct core characteristics that distinguish it from other types of attacks [16]. Identifying
those core characteristics and setting them as the attack behavior memory (i.e., phantom
component), allows the use of spectral graph tools to detect the attack and trigger a quick
and effective network response.
As part of the development process, the system must also be analyzed and evaluated to
determine performance and limitations. Since the system relies on real-time network traffic
for detection, the detection capabilities of the system must be analyzed under both ideal
and non-ideal network conditions. For ideal network conditions, an absorbing Markov
chain and a model of the identified network traffic feature associated with worm and
DDoS attack behaviors will be developed to describe the proposed system for the purpose
of analyzing false alarm rates. For non-ideal network conditions, the system detection
capability will be analyzed using both traditional and novel eigenvalue and eigenvector
3
Figure 1.3. Design approach for SGCDC system.
perturbation techniques. Finally, the system detection capability to detect, classify, and
respond to worm and DDoS attacks needs to be validated to determine detection and
classification rates, detection times, false alarm rates, and response performance. This will
be conducted using both real world and modeled datasets that contain normal and attack
traffic.
With respect to design and implementation, we apply two constraints to the proposed
SGCDC system. First, the SGCDC system is restrained to the detection and classification
of scan-based transmission control protocol (TCP) worm attacks and synchronize (SYN)
flood DDoS attacks. While this restraint is implemented for the research in this dissertation,
the proposed SGCDC system has the potential to detect other forms of worm and DDoS
attacks, along with other forms of cyber attacks, with minor modifications. Second, each
node being analyzed by the SGCDC system is restrained to a single attack type. In other
words, a node can be either normal, under worm attack, or under DDoS attack. A node
cannot be under worm and DDoS attack simultaneously.
1.2 Related Work
There is no precedent for a biological immune system-inspired cyber defense system that
employs spectral graph-based anomaly detection; however, there are six categories in liter-
ature that were influential to both the development of our solution approach and analysis
of our proposed system: biological immune system-inspired cyber systems, graph theory-
based anomaly detection, spectral graph theory-based anomaly detection, network anomaly
detection metrics, traffic modeling, and perturbation analysis of eigenvectors. This section
reviews the significant work from each of these categories that contributed to our work.
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1.2.1 Biological Immune System-Inspired Cyber Systems
While a significant amount of research has been conducted on biological immune system-
inspired cyber defense ( [17]–[19], among others), we leaned heavily on material from [14]
and [20] to understand the mechanics of and draw inspiration from a biological immune
system-inspired cyber defense system. The work by Kephart in [14] produced one of the first
biological immune system-inspired cyber defense systems. His host-based cyber defense
approach uses system antibodies to remember previously encountered viruses and worms
in an effort to quickly recognize and respond to future encounters of the same attack. The
system antibodies are developed by using decoy programs to capture samples of signatures
from the previously encountered virus or worm.
The network-based cyber defense approach by Hofmeyr and Forrest in [20] uses similar
signature-based detection in their biological immune system-inspired cyber defense system.
Their approach applies an artificial immune system to LISYS, a network intrusion detection
system, in an attempt to mimic the processes observed in the biological immune system.
Specifically, they utilize graph theory to model a local set of detectors, each of which is
associated with a binary string for detection and can only interact with its directly connected
neighbors. The system utilizes the detectors to perform binary string matching via an A-
contiguous rule to identify non-self binary strings.
While both works produce good results, their systems do not perform optimally in the
face of zero-day attacks. In [14], the cyber defense system develops system antibodies
only if an anomaly is detected. As a result, the system will not develop antibodies until
after the zero-day attack has occurred. In [20], the cyber defense system requires a human
operator to identify the first occurrence of non-self for zero-day attacks of any form. As
a result, we intend to employ modified portions of both systems in our solution approach.
Specifically, we seek tomodify the concept behind the antibody development process in [14]
and the A-contiguous bit matching rule in [20] to transform historical attack patterns into
a graphical attack model that can be utilized to form phantom component for behavioral
detection instead of signature detection. As a result, we seek to increase the likelihood
of the proposed SGCDC system to detect zero-day attacks through the implementation of
these phantom components since the detection is not based on a previously encountered
binary string but rather the intrinsic attack properties and behaviors that are critical across
the different variations of the attack type. We also intend to adapt the concept of utilizing
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human operators in [20] to develop the phantom component from historical attack records.
1.2.2 Graph Theory-Based Anomaly Detection
Graph theory has not been widely applied to solving anomaly detection problems. Le
et al. [21] and Ellis et al. [22] utilized graph theory-based methods to study anomaly
detection. The work in [21] uses a TDG to model network traffic and graph theory metrics
to perform anomaly detection. The system then utilizes a different mechanism, the VF2
graph matching algorithm, to compare the graphical representation of the anomalous flow
to known anomalous graphical representations for the purpose of classifying the anomaly.
While the method is successful, it assumes that the system has all known attack patterns
without providing any explanation as to how zero-day attack patterns are accounted for.
Additionally, the system incurs increased computational overhead by performing two distinct
mathematical processes for detection and classification. As a result, we only intend to adopt
the use of TDGs as a method of graphically representing network traffic. We also seek to
improve upon this work by using graph theory tools to decrease the computational overhead
required to perform both detection and classification.
The work in [22] uses a specific graphical behavior signature of computer worm propagation
to detect worm activity. Specifically, the worm detection algorithm employed by their system
looks for worm causal-tree behavior via various graph metric thresholds (e.g., branching
factor and depth). While their proposed solution is effective and efficient in identifying the
presence of a worm attack, it fails to inherently identify the specific nodes infected by the
attack without additional analysis and/or computation. As a result, our solution approach
intends to adapt and expand upon their graphical behavior signature for worms by applying
the concept to other types of attacks to develop phantom components that graphically
describe the attack behavior. Our proposed system also seeks to improve upon their work
by using a spectral graph detection process that inherently identifies not only the infected
nodes but also the potential victims being targeted by the infected node.
1.2.3 Spectral Graph Theory-Based Anomaly Detection
Johnson [23] utilizes spectral graph-based tools to detect congestion in the physical layer
of a software-defined network. The detection process uses a phantom node to produce
a threshold in the eigenspectrum to identify nodes that are both under-utilized and over
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congested for the purpose of load balancing. While the research provides non-specific
immediate responses to network traffic anomalies, it cannot differentiate between normal
network congestion and congestion brought about by attack. Additionally, it cannot detect
attacks that do not produce network congestion. However, the work does identify through
simulation a potential relationship between node connectivity and the eigenvectormagnitude
values, which is utilized in the detection mechanism. As a result, we intend to expand upon
this spectral graph detection technique in our proposed system by defining and providing
a mathematical foundation for the observed relationship. We also intend to expand upon
the phantom node concept to develop phantom components for the purpose of detecting
anomalies within the network logical flows at the transport layer.
1.2.4 Network Anomaly Detection Metrics
A significant amount of research exists on network anomaly detection techniques for worm
( [22], [24]–[30], among others) and DDoS attacks ( [31]–[34], among others); however,
the vast majority of detection techniques proposed in literature are specific to one type of
network attack. Additionally, a significant number of works fail to provide key empirical
metrics that describe the capability and performance of their proposed detection system
or technique. Table 1.1 lists the detection metrics that we found in literature for methods
designed to detect both worm and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.We seek to improve upon










































































































































A significant amount of research [36]–[38] has been conducted to demonstrate that traffic
features with high variance and asymmetry cannot be accurately modeled using traditional
distributions, like Poisson and Gaussian. In [38]–[41], the stable distribution has been
proposed to overcome the limitations observed in the traditional distributions for modeling
network traffic features. In [42]–[46], mixture modeling has been proposed to improve
model accuracy and outcomes. In fact, the mixture modeling truncation approach in [43]–
[45] has been proposed in the financial world to capture the heavy tails of value-at-risk
and asset return models. While both the stable distribution and the truncation approaches
proposed in literature account for heavy-tailed traffic features, they do not account for traffic
with extremely large zero-counts in combination with heavy-tails. As a result, we intend to
develop a novel mixture model for traffic that has both a high zero-count and a heavy tail,
for the purpose of analyzing our proposed system under ideal network conditions.
1.2.6 Eigenvector Perturbations
A significant amount of research has been conducted on perturbation analysis of the eigen-
vectors of a Hermitian matrix. Davis and Kahan [47] is prominent and foundational within
this field of research. They developed a fundamental theorem describing the rotation of
eigenvectors resulting from a perturbation in the Hermitian matrix. Since their work, sev-
eral works [48]–[53], among others, have proposed variations or improvements to Davis
and Kahan’s work. Still, none of the works in literature analyze the distance between the
perturbed and unperturbed vectors of the eigenvector matrix, specifically with respect to
the nodal basis. As a result, we intend to expand upon the research in literature by applying
the =-dimensional Euclidean distance formula to the =-dimensional vector of a single node
within the nodal basis to analyze the distance between the perturbed and unperturbed vectors
for the purpose of analyzing our proposed system under non-ideal network conditions.
1.3 Organization
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Background on topics and concepts
that are necessary to describe and perform analysis of our proposed system are contained in
Chapter 2. Our solution approach with detailed descriptions of each component are provided
in Chapter 3. Analysis of the proposed system under ideal and non-ideal network conditions
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is contained in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 6 provides validation results from a simulated
implementation of the proposed SGCDC system. Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation with
a summary of the work and contributions in this dissertation, along with recommendations
for future research. There are two appendices. Appendix A contains the derivations of state
transitions discussed in Chapter 4. Appendix B includes additional results from the false
alarm rate analysis of the proposed system in Chapters 4 and 5.
The contents of this dissertation include material adapted from work to be published by
the author. Sections from Chapter 3 contain some revised material from “Spectral Graph-
based Cyber Worm Detection Using Phantom Components and Strong Node Concept”
by Jamie Safar, Murali Tummala, and John McEachen, to be published in the 54th Hawaii
International Conference on SystemSciences. Sections fromChapter 4 contain some revised
material from “A Novel Lévy-Impulse Mixture Based Connection Model for Computer
Network Traffic” by Jamie Safar, Chad Bollmann, Murali Tummala, and JohnMcEachen, to





In this chapter, we present background material necessary to describe our proposed system.
First, we introduce graph theory for modeling networks and network behaviors. Next, we
explore spectral graph theory as a method of network analysis and behavior detection. Then,
we examine the characteristics of worm and DDoS attacks to develop an understanding of
the attack behavior the system must detect. Next, we utilize the attack characteristics to
discuss network feature modeling as a means of developing a baseline of normal network
behavior. Then, we discuss pertinent dual-basis perturbation theory to support the analysis of
the system. Finally, we explore network countermeasure modeling as a means of evaluating
system responses.
2.1 Graph Theory
The objective of this body of work is to develop a cyber defense system that utilizes
spectral graph theory tools for detection and classification of worm and DDoS attacks.
Thus, background on graph theory is necessary to explain the spectral graph techniques
employed by the proposed SGCDC system.We begin this section with a discussion of graph
theory terminology utilized in this work to model networks. We conclude this section with
a review of the TDGs, a graph theory approach to model network traffic flows.
2.1.1 Terminology
The fundamentals of graph theory described in [54]–[56] are restated here in the notation
adopted throughout this dissertation. A graph  is described as
 = (#, !,,), (2.1)
where # is the set of nodes, ! is the set of links, and , is the set of link weights [54],
[55]. For the purpose of this dissertation, graph is used interchangeably with network, node
is used interchangeably with both host and computer hardware device, and link is used
interchangeably with communications path.
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Any network can be represented either directionally or connectionally. An undirected graph
 contains undirected links, and a directed graph 38A contains directed links. For 38A ,
links in each direction have independent link weights [54], [55]. For both  and 38A , there
are two types of graphs: complete and simple. The ! of a complete graph  = contains
the complete set of links that connect every pair of nodes in # . If ! does not contain the
entire set of links, the graph is considered simple [54], [56]. Additionally, both  and 38A
can be described as connected or disconnected. A network is considered connected if a
communications path exists between all pairs of nodes. Conversely, a network is considered
disconnected if a communication path does not exist between all pairs of nodes. In the case
of a disconnected network, the network is composed of a set of components (or clusters)
where a communication path does not exist between the components [55].
To model or38A , the adjacency matrix  or directed adjacency matrix 38A , respectively,
is formed from the information in Equation 2.1. The = × = adjacency matrices,  and 38A ,
are both defined as
(8, 9) = 38A(8, 9) =

|8, 9 if 08 9 , ∈ !,
0 otherwise,
(2.2)
where |8, 9 is the weight of ;8, 9 , ;8, 9 is the link connecting node 8 to node 9 , and 08, 9 is the
adjacency element associated with ;8, 9 . Since  is an undirected matrix, |8, 9 = | 9 ,8, thus
resulting in a symmetric matrix [54], [55].
For 38A , node degrees are described by a set of degree matrices: the in-degree matrix 8=
and the out-degree matrix >DC . The = × = matrix 8= describes the total number of links




:=1 |:, 9 if 8 = 9 ,
0 otherwise.
(2.3)
The = × = matrix >DC describes the total number of links directionally pointed from the








For , the = × = degree matrix  characterizes the total number of links that exist for each
node. This means  = 8=(8, 9) = >DC(8, 9) [54], [55].
The = × = Laplacian matrix & of  is defined as [55]




−|8, 9 if 08, 9 ∈ !,∑=
:=1 |8,: if 8 = 9 ,
0 otherwise.
(2.6)
This matrix contains all necessary information to visually reconstruct the network data
associated with  into a graphical format [55].
2.1.2 Traffic Dispersion Graphs
A traffic dispersion graph (TDG) is a special case of 38A where network logical flows are
utilized to create 38A , 8=, and >DC for the purpose of modeling network traffic. TDGs are
utilized in literature as a method to analyze network feature characteristics [57] and perform
anomaly detection [21]. The graphical representation of a TDG provides a visual model of
the end-to-end communications within the network. For a TDG, 38A is described by the
set of nodes containing the sources and destinations of logical end-to-end communications
(or flows), the set of links between the source a destination logical flows, and the set of
link weights [21]. The |8, 9 = 1 if a logical flow exists from node 8 to node 9 , and |8, 9 = 0
if a logical flow does not exist from node 8 to node 9 . The standard TCP-tuple is used to
identify the existence of a flow and the source and destination information associated with
the flow [21]. The resulting 38A is composed of a set of components that represent the
communication clusters.
2.2 Spectral Graph Theory
Concepts and techniques from spectral graph theory, a sub-field of graph theory, are em-
ployed by the spectral graph detection mechanism of the proposed SGCDC system for the
purpose of detecting worm and DDoS attacks. Thus, background on spectral graph theory
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is critical to explaining the detection process of the proposed system. We begin this section
with a discussion of the dual basis as a method to represent the spectral characteristics of
a graph. We then describe the information contained within each basis and explain how
the dual basis can be utilized to extract different graph characteristics. We conclude with
an examination of phantom nodes as a method to develop reference points within the dual
basis for the purpose of analyzing network behavior.
2.2.1 Dual-Basis Representation
The fundamentals of spectral graph theory and the dual-basis representation described
in [55], [58], [59] are restated here to provide a baseline of terminology and notation adopted
throughout this thesis. The dual-basis representation is dependent on the eigenvalue and
eigenvector of &, which are defined as the solution to
&{ 9 = _ 9 { 9 , (2.7)
where _ 9 is the 9 Cℎ eigenvalue in the eigenspectrum, and { 9 is the eigenvector corresponding
to _ 9 . The elements of { 9 are represented as {8, 9 , where 8 is the row of the eigenvector and 9
is the index of the eigenspectrum, and [55]
=∑
8=1
{28, 9 = 1. (2.8)
The order of the eigenvalues within the eigenspectrum is
0 = _1 ≤ _2 ≤ ... ≤ _= (2.9)
where = = #C>C , and #C>C is the total number of nodes in the network [55].
The set of eigenvalue-eigenvector solutions are described in matrix form as
& = +Λ+) (2.10)
where Λ is the = × = diagonal matrix of eigenvalues, + is the = × = orthonormal matrix of
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= concatenated { 9 [55], [59]. Given that
++) = =, (2.11)
where = is the = × = identity matrix [59], the right eigenvector representation is defined as
&+ = +Λ, (2.12)
and the left eigenvector representation is defined as [23]
+)& = Λ+) . (2.13)
Utilizing the transformations defined in equations 2.12 and 2.13, the eigencentrality basis
is defined as +Λ and the nodal basis is defined as Λ+) . The eigencentrality basis describes
network centrality by measuring the degree of impact each node has on each of the eigenval-
ues across the eigenspectrum. The nodal basis describes nodal influence by measuring the
degree of impact a single node has on each of the eigenvalues across the eigenspectrum [23],
[60]. Combining together to form the dual-basis representation, these two bases allow for
analysis of network robustness, centrality, and connectivity [58], [60].
2.2.2 Phantom Nodes
A phantom node is a concept employed in [23] to create a nodal reference point within
the eigenspectrum of the dual-basis to perform connectivity analysis on other nodes in the
network. A phantom node is defined in [23] as a single node that does not physically exist in
the network but exists mathematically within . The links connected to the phantom node
have a static |8, 9 . The number of links and their |8, 9 cause the phantom node to have the
primary nodal influence {?A8
8, 9
in a specific index of the eigenspectrum, where {?A8
8, 9
is defined
as the largest |{8, 9 | within { 9 . The location of {?A88, 9 of a node in the eigenspectrum is then
utilized to determine the connectivity of a node relative to the phantom node [23]. From the
simulation results in [23], the author concludes that nodes that have {?A8
8, 9
in eigenspectrum
indices larger than the eigenspectrum index where the phantom node has {?A8
8, 9
are more
connected than the phantom node. Conversely, nodes that have {?A8
8, 9
in eigenspectrum indices
smaller than the eigenspectrum index where the phantom node has {?A8
8, 9
are less connected
than the phantom node.
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2.3 Worm and DDoS Attack Behaviors
The spectral graph detection mechanism of the proposed SGCDC system is designed to
detect worm and DDoS attacks. Thus, background on worm and DDoS attack behaviors is
necessary to explain the filtering and detection processes within our proposed model. We
begin this section with a discussion of worm attack behavior before moving to a discussion
of DDoS attack behavior.
2.3.1 Worm Attack Behavior
Due to its self-propagating nature, a worm requires the ability to locate vulnerable hosts
in order to spread. The process of searching for vulnerable hosts is called the target search
process, and the process of identifying these vulnerable hosts is called target discovery. As
part of the target search and discovery processes, worms employ two main techniques to
locate and identify vulnerable hosts: topology-based techniques and scan-based techniques
[61]. Our SGCDC system is designed to detect scan-based TCPworms. As a result, the term
“worm attack” implies a scan-based TCP worm attack for the remainder of this dissertation.
TCP worms employ the TCP three-way connection handshake [62] in conjunction with
scan-based techniques [61] during the target search and discovery processes to identify
potential victims to infect. In other words, TCP SYN packets are utilized to probe a specific
set of IP addresses via random or localized scanning to identify vulnerable hosts. Random
scanning randomly selects an IP address from the address space to probe while localized
scanning has a higher probability of selecting an IP addresses closer to its own address than
an address further away [61].
Random scanning utilizes three main scanning strategies: uniform, hit-list, and routable.
Uniform scanning utilizes the entire internet protocol version 4 (IPv4) address space to
identify and target vulnerable hosts without preference. This means that each internet
protocol (IP) address has an equal probability of being selected from the entire address
space, and it requires the use of a perfect random number generator to randomly select target
IP addresses [61]. Hit-list scanning selects an IP address to target from a pre-developed list of
vulnerable targets. The worm scans all IP addresses on the hit-list and infects the vulnerable
targets before moving forward with the basic random scanning technique [61], [63]. This
strategy, introduced in [63], results in an initial acceleration of worm propagation during
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the early stages of infection since the worm scans are focused on known vulnerable hosts,
and time is not wasted scanning invulnerable hosts [61], [63]. Routable scanning selects
routable IP addresses to scan and target instead of the entire IPv4 address space [61].
Localized scanning also utilizes three main scanning strategies: local preference, sequential,
and selective. Local preference scanning focuses on the concept that there is not a uniform
distribution of vulnerable hosts across the internet [61]. Therefore, the target of the scan
is more likely to have an IP addresses close to the infected host IP address than further
away [61], [64]. In other words, the worm is more likely to target a host within the same /16
or /8 subnetwork as the source IP address than some other random IP address [64]. Sequential
scanning selects consecutive IP addresses starting from an initial address determined by the
worm. A specific type of sequential scanning is preferential sequential scanning where the
worm chooses a starting IP address closer to its own IP addresses with a higher probability
than addresses further away Selective scanning focuses on destroying a certain range of IP
addresses. As a result, the scanning space is reduced from the entire IPv4 address space to
a certain IP address area [61].
2.3.2 DDoS Attack Behavior
A DoS attack is a malicious attempt to severely degrade the availability of a network
resource (host, router, server, network, etc.) [65], [66]. The majority of DoS attacks are
distributed where the attacker, known as the bot master, acquires a large number of hosts,
called bots, that form a network called a botnet [66], [67]. As a result, the bots, unaware of
the compromise, simultaneously attack a target [66] through exploitation of vulnerabilities
or flooding of packets [65].
DDoS attacks fall into one of three categories: volume-based, protocol-based, or application
layer-based. The goal of a volume-based attack is to reduce the available bandwidth of the
victim. Protocol-based attacks, on the other hand, attempt to expend the resources of the
victim. Finally, application layer-based attacks attempt to crash a web server by using
requests that appear legitimate [67]. In this dissertation, the SGCDC system is designed to
detect a particular protocol-based attack, the SYN flood attack. As a result, the term “DDoS
attack” implies a SYN flood attack for the remainder of this dissertation.
A SYN flood attack exploits a vulnerability that exists in the TCP three-way connection
17
handshake. To flood, the attacker sends numerous SYN packets to the victim but does not
respond with an ACK to the SYN-ACK response. As a result, the TCP connections remain
half-opened while the victim waits for an acknowledgement that the connection is opened,
thus resulting in a degradation of victim availability [67].
2.4 Modeling Network Traffic
To evaluate the proposed theoretical performance of the SGCDC system under ideal network
conditions, amathematicalmodel of network SYN traffic is required.Network traffic features
like SYN packets have been known to exhibit behavioral characteristics like asymmetry and
heavy tails that are not accuratelymodeledwith traditional distributions, such as Poisson and
Gaussian [36]–[38]. Both the stable distribution and mixture modeling have shown promise
in providing a more accurate model for these types of network traffic features [39]–[43],
[46]. We utilize both techniques in our research to develop a distribution that accurately fits
the behavior of network SYN traffic. Thus, background on mixture modeling and the stable
distribution is critical to the methodology we employ to determine the system theoretical
false alarm rates. As a result, we define a mixture model and examine the characteristics of
the stable distribution in the following subsections.
2.4.1 Mixture Modeling
Mixturemodels contain custommixtures of different distributions intended to either leverage
or mitigate properties of the individual components in order to provide a better distribution






with |< > 0 and
∑
|< = 1, where |< is the mixture weight. Equation 2.14 describes a
complete stochastic model that can be utilized to generate new data [68].
2.4.2 Stable Laws and the Lévy Distribution
The stable distribution stems from the stable laws, which were developed by Lévy in the
1920s while conducting research on the sum of two independent random variables [69].
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The laws define random variable - as stable (- ∼ (U(V, W, `)) if
0-1 + 1-2 = 2- + 3 (2.15)
is true for all (0, 1) ∈ R+×R+, 2 ∈ R+ and 3 ∈ R [70]. This law is utilized to form a family of
stable distributions, also known as: U-stable, Pareto stable, and Lévy stable [69]. Extensive
theory and mathematical proofs regarding these distributions is outside of the scope of this
dissertation and can be found in [42], [71]–[73], among other works.
The U-stable distribution is described by four parameters, U, V, W, and `, each of which
control a specific aspect of the distribution [39]. The properties and ranges of these four
parameters are listed in Table 2.1. Except for three special cases described in Table 2.2, the
U-stable distribution does not have a closed-form solution [39], [71]. Instead, the U-stable
RV - ∼ ((U, V, W, `) is described by its characteristic function [39]
[ 48\-] = 4−W
U |\ |U[ 1−8V tan( cU2 )sign(\)] +8`\ (2.16)
for U 6= 1, and




for U = 1. This characteristic function is defined as the Fourier transform of the probability
distribution function (PDF) [39], [42], [71].
Table 2.1. U-Stable distribution parameters. Source: [39].
Parameter Property Range










The Lévy distribution, a special case of the U-stable distribution, sets U = 0.5 and V = 1,
resulting in a closed-form PDF of - , defined as








for G > ` [39], [42]. The closed-form PDF solution of the Lévy distribution facilitates
applying traditional statistical techniques for fit estimation and to perform distribution
analysis.
2.5 Dual-Basis Perturbation Theorems
To evaluate the proposed theoretical performance of the SGCDC system under non-ideal
network conditions, the spectral graph detection mechanism must be analyzed for potential
vulnerabilities that exist within the dual-basis. In the case of network analysis, the dual-basis
is prone to perturbations as a result of noise or congestion among the network communica-
tions [48]–[50], [74]. Therefore, background on eigenvalue and eigenvector perturbations
is critical to analyzing the effects of noise and congestion on the ability of the system to
accurately detect attacks. While a significant amount of research has been conducted on per-
turbations within the dual-basis ( [48]–[50], [52], [53], among others), this section focuses
on the two main theorems that are utilized in this work to analyze the detection mechanism
of the proposed system: Weyl’s theorem and the Davis-Kahan theorem.
2.5.1 Weyl’s Theorem
Weyl’s theorem [48], often referred to as the eigenvalue stability inequality, provides an
upper bound on the change of _ 9 given any perturbation in & as a result of perturbation(s)
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in . Let the change of _ 9 be defined as
Δ_ 9 =| _ 9 (&̂) − _ 9 (&) |, (2.19)
where
&̂ = & +&4AA>A , (2.20)
&̂ is the perturbed Laplacian matrix, and&4AA>A is the Laplacian error matrix resulting from
the = × = matrix that contains the errors applied to  [75]. Additionally, let
‖ &4AA>A ‖>?= _<0G , (2.21)
where
_<0G = <0G(| _1(&4AA>A) |, | _=(&4AA>A) |) (2.22)
and | |•| | is the spectral norm [48], [75]. We have:
Theorem 1 (Weyl’s theorem [48]). For any 9 ∈ [=], Δ_ 9 ≤‖ &4AA>A ‖>?.
Weyl’s theorem is derived by combining the Courant-Fischer min-max theorem and the
Wielandt minimax linear relationship. The Courant-Fischer min-max theorem and proof
and the Wielandt minimax formula and linear relationship are found in [75] along with the
derivation of the eigenvalue stability inequality.
2.5.2 The Davis-Kahan Theorem and the Eigencentrality Basis
The Davis-Kahan theorem [47] provides an upper bound on the angle of rotation \ 9 between
{ 9 and {̂ 9 , where {̂ 9 is the 9 Cℎ eigenvector of &̂. Let _̂ 9 be the 9 Cℎ eigenvalue of &̂. Additionally,
assume that _ 9 and _̂ 9 have a multiplicity of one. We then have:
Theorem 2 (Davis-Kahan theorem [48]). Define the min change in eigenvalues as ^ 9 =
<8={| _̂: − _ 9 |: 9 6= C}. Then sin \ 9 ≤ ‖&4AA>A ‖^ 9 .
The proof and additional cases and/or variations of the Davis-Kahan theorem are found
in [48]–[50], among other works.
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2.6 Modeling Network Countermeasures
In addition to evaluating the detection and classification performance of the SGCDC system,
the countermeasure response mechanism is also modeled for analysis. Two types of models
have been proposed in literature to model network countermeasures: epidemic models [76]
and a passivity-basedmodel [77]. Since epidemicmodeling ismorewidely used in literature,
it is the methodology employed in this work. Thus, background on epidemic modeling is
critical to the approach employed in this dissertation to evaluate the proposed response of
the system. In this section, we begin with a brief overview of epidemic models. Then we
explore the susceptible-infectious-recovered (SIR) model utilized in this work to evaluate
the SGCDC system.
2.6.1 Epidemic Models
Epidemic models have become the standard in literature for malware analysis because they
provide researchers with the ability to analyze the attack spread behavior and the effects
of a specific countermeasure while balancing performance and cost [76]. The inclusion
of different countermeasures has resulted in numerous compartmental models to simulate
various defensive strategies, including the SI, SIS, SIR, SEIR, SEIQRS, SEIQV, [76], and
SEIUR [78] models, among others [76].
While one model has not been used more often in literature than others for defensive strat-
egy analysis, the various proposed models result from modifications of the fundamental
susceptible-infectious (SI), susceptible-infectious-susceptible (SIS), and SIR [79], [80] epi-
demic models. For defensive countermeasures employed against worm and DDoS attacks,
the SIR model is the best-fit since we assume that recovery from an attack is possible, and
re-infection from the same attack is not possible.
2.6.2 SIR Model
The SIR model, otherwise known as the Kermark-McKendrick model or the Classical
General Epidemic model [79], is depicted in Figure 2.1. It contains three compartments:
susceptible (, infectious , and recovered ' [80]. With respect to computer networks, (
typically contains all nodes in the network at initialization. A node transitions from ( to  if
it becomes infected/attacked, and from  to ' if it recovers from the infection/attack. A node
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that is in ' is considered immune to infection and will remain in that state forever [80]. In
other words, the model describes a closed population in which the infection will eventually
die out [81].
Figure 2.1. Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) model with infection con-
tact rate 1 and recovery rate :. Adapted from [80].












where 1 is the infection contact rate, : is the recovery rate, (C>C is the number of susceptible,
C>C is the number of infectious, and 'C>C is the number of recovered [81].
Utilizing Equation 2.23, the basic reproduction number of the system '0 is derived. Given an
infection within a susceptible population, '0 describes the number of secondary infections
that can be expected from the spread of the infection [82]. It describes the stability of both the
infection-free and epidemic equilibrium, providing a quantitative measure of the infection
spread [83]. If '0 ≤ 1, the system will head toward in infection-free equilibrium over time.
On the other hand, if '0 ≥ 1, the system will head toward an epidemic equilibrium over





As a result, the stability of the system is directly dependent on 1 and : .
In summary, this chapter summarized the background technical material necessary for
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describing the fundamental concepts of our proposed model, and for understanding the
methods employed to analyze the performance of our proposed system. With this baseline




Spectral Graph-Based Cyber Defense System
In this chapter, we propose a novel cyber detection and classification system for worm and
DDoS attacks utilizing spectral graph theory tools. The proposed detection and classification
methods take advantage of the extensive theory andmathematical techniques associatedwith
graph theory and spectral graph theory, which are discussed in Chapter 2.While we limit our
proposed methods to worm and DDoS attacks, the methodologies presented in this chapter
could be utilized against other various cyber attacks with minor modifications. Furthermore,
we narrow our proposed system to the detection of TCP-based attacks, but the system could
be employed against UDP-based attacks with minor modification to the filters.
Referring to Figure 3.1, our proposed SGCDC system contains five functional components.
First, the relevant traffic flows are filtered and processed into a usable format as part of the
network behavior sensing component. Graph spectral analysis techniques are then applied
to the data to detect attack behaviors in the spectral graph detection component. Then,
the detected attack behaviors are classified as either worm or DDoS in the classification
component. In the case of worm attacks, the detected attack behaviors are stored in system
memory as part of a feedback loop process. Finally, the attack parameter outputs of the
detection and classification mechanisms are utilized to determine appropriate network
response actions in the response component.
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Figure 3.1. Proposed SGCDC system component model.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, we provide a detailed description
of the five components of the proposed SGCDC system. Then, we define the external system
parameters that are required to be initialized by the network administrator.
This chapter includesmaterial adapted fromwork to be published by the author. Specifically,
sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.6 contain some revised material from “Spectral Graph-based Cyber
Worm Detection Using Phantom Components and Strong Node Concept” by Jamie Safar,
Murali Tummala, and John McEachen, to be published in the 54th Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences.
3.1 Network Behavior Sensing
The network behavior sensing component shown in Figure 3.2 utilizes the network traffic
flows to perform the following functions: data windowing, behavior filtering, and TDG
formation. The outputs of this component are the undirected, first-level offspring adjacency
matrix 1, the undirected, second-level offspring adjacency matrix 2, and the dual-degree
matrix, which are utilized by the spectral graph detection and classification components.
To fully describe the network behavior sensing component, we discuss the three functional
processes of the component in detail in the order that they are performed.
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Figure 3.2. Functional processes of the network behavior sensing component.
3.1.1 Time Window
The network behavior sensing component makes use of time windows to decrease the
amount of data being processed by the system at any given time. The system employs
an overlapping time window, as shown in Figure 3.3, where each window begins halfway
through the previous window. The length of the time window !| is externally determined
by the network administrator, which is discussed in Section 3.6.
Figure 3.3. Overlapping time window representation
The overlapping time windows are necessary to overcome the missed detection problems
that arise from a single shifted-window. When an attack exists in time across two single
shifted-windows, there is a possibility that the attack will not be detected if the traffic in
each window does not meet threshold requirements. Figure 3.4 shows the probability of
window detection of a modeled Blaster worm utilizing the SGCDC system with a one
second single shifted-window, a worm phantom component threshold )|>A<
?ℎ0=C><
= 13, and
a memory log time C;> = 40 seconds (see Section 3.6 for discussion of )|>A<?ℎ0=C>< and C;>).
For the single shifted-window, the number of windows that failed to detect worm activity
increase as the size of the infection increases. For the same simulation, the overlapping time
window had a window detection probability of one for all end infection sizes. Unlike the
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single shifted-window, the overlapping time window allows the system to account for the
occurrence of an attack across multiple windows.
Figure 3.4. Probability of window detections for modeled Blaster worm using
a one-second single shifted-window.
3.1.2 Behavior Filter
The network behavior sensing component utilizes a behavior filter to further decrease the
computational overhead for the system and to eliminate traffic that does not match the known
behavioral characteristics of a worm or DDoS attack. In other words, not all traffic flows
within a window are utilized to form the TDG (discussed in Section 3.1.3). Depending on
the known graphical and behavioral characteristics of the attack to be detected, the network
logical flows are filtered for behavior prior to forming 38A . Additionally, the spectral graph
detection component only requires information on the presence or absence of a flow between
any two nodes. As a result, the elements of 38A are defined as
08, 9 =

0 if no flow exists,
1 if at least one flow exists .
(3.1)
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In other words, 38A is normalized so that each matrix element either equals zero, repre-
senting the absence of a flow between the two nodes in either direction or one, representing
the presence of a flow between the two nodes in either direction. This further reduces the
system computational overhead by only utilizing unique traffic flows.
Since our research specifically focuses on TCP worm attacks and SYN-flood DDoS attacks,
the behavior filter eliminates traffic flows that do not match the known SYN behaviors
of these attacks. For worm attacks, the sending of SYN packets in the TCP three-way
handshake results in a causal-tree [22], [84] graphical representation of the attack behavior
regardless of the specific scanning technique employed. The graphical representation of the
worm attack behavior is shown in Figure 3.5 where %|
8, 9
is 9 Cℎ worm parent node on the 8Cℎ
attack level (representing an infected host) and $|
8, 9
is the 9 Cℎ worm offspring node on the
8Cℎ attack level (representing a host that is scanned by the infected node). It is important to
note that only two levels of infected parent nodes are shown in Figure 3.5, but worm attacks
typically result in many levels of infected parents due to the causal-tree behavior [22], [84].
Figure 3.5. Graphical representation of worm attack behavior from SYN scan
traffic.
For DDoS attacks, the sending of SYN packets results in a graphical representation that
appears as an inverted, single-level worm attack. The graphical representation of the DDoS
attack behavior is shown in Figure 3.6 where %3 is the DDoS parent node (representing the
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attacked host) and $3
8
are the DDoS offspring nodes (representing hosts that are attacking
the parent node).
Figure 3.6. Graphical representation of DDoS attack behavior from SYN
attack traffic.
Due to the feedback loop from the data storage sub-system (see Section 3.4), two filtering
functions are performed on the windowed traffic flows. First, the traffic is filtered for first-
level offspring. To conform with worm and DDoS attack behaviors, only traffic flows that
contain a packet with flags SYN=1 and ACK=0 (i.e., the first packet of the TCP three-way
handshake) and a unique destination address are utilized to form the directed, first-level
offspring adjacency matrix 1
38A
. Second, the traffic is filtered for second-level offspring. To
conform with the worm attack behavior, only traffic flows from 1
38A
that have a source IP
address that was previously flagged by the spectral graph detection component as offspring




3.1.3 Traffic Dispersion Graphs




, are the mathematical representations of the
filtered TDG of the network (see Section 2.1.2 for more information on TDGs). The network




to create 1, 2, and





to form 1 and 2, respectively, via the process shown in Aglorithm 1. The dual-degree
matrix is formed by combining 8= and >DC , which is discussed in detail in Section 3.3.1.
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Algorithm 1: Algorithm to form 8 from 838A
for i from 1 to n do
for j from 1 to i do







3.2 Spectral Graph Detection Component
The spectral graph detection component is the central anomaly detection mechanism of the
proposed SGCDC system. This component performs eigenanalysis to identify anomalous
behaviors through the employment of the strong node concept and phantom components.
More specifically, as shown in Figure 3.7, the undirected adjacency matrices, 1 and 2,
produced by the network behavior sensing component are utilized by the spectral graph
detection component to perform the following functions: phantom component attachment,
eigendecomposition, and anomaly detection using the strong node concept. The outputs of
this component are the detected parent and offspring nodes exhibiting attack behavior.
Figure 3.7. Functional processes of the spectral graph detection component.
Before we can delve into the strong node concept detection process utilized by the spectral
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graph detection component, we must first define phantom components and provide a de-
scription of the phantom component associated with worm and DDoS attack detection. We
must also define the strong node concept, which is fundamental to the detection mechanism.
Once this foundation is established, we discuss how phantom components are combined
with the strong node concept to produce thresholds in the eigenspectrum of the dual-basis,
which are utilized by the spectral graph detection component to detect worm and DDoS
attacks.
3.2.1 Phantom Components
Phantom components are crucial elements for the detection mechanism of the spectral
graph detection component. Expanding upon the phantom node concept in [23] (described
in Chapter 2), a phantom component is defined as a group of connected nodes that do
not exist in the directed adjacency matrix of the TDG but exist mathematically within
the undirected adjacency matrix for the purpose of spectral analysis. In broader terms, a
phantomcomponent provides a graphical depiction of amalicious behavior that is utilized for
detection. The number of nodes that make up the phantom component and the connection
of those nodes describe both the desired detection threshold and the attack behavior for
detection, respectively.
While the worm and DDoS attack behaviors are graphically directional (see figures 3.5 and
3.6), the phantom component exists within the symmetric, undirected adjacencymatrix. As a
result, the undirected graphical representation of a worm and DDoS attack is identical when
only considering first-level offspring. As a result, the same phantom component construct,
shown in Figure 3.8, is employed by the spectral graph detection component for both worm
and DDoS attack detection. For the purposes of the proposed system, the links between the
nodes within the phantom component have a static link weight equal to one. The difference
between the phantom component utilized for worm detection and the phantom component
utilized for DDoS detection is the number of offspring nodes connected to the parent node.
The number of offspring nodes within the phantom component, defined as the phantom
threshold )?ℎ0=C><, is externally determined by the network administrator (see Section 3.6).
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Figure 3.8. Graphical representation of the phantom component utilized by
the SGCDC system for worm and DDoS attack detection.
It is important to note that the phantom component for worm attack detection only covers
the first-level offspring from the graphical attack behavior of the worm (see Figure 3.5). In
order to attain additional levels of offspring using this phantom component, memory must
be introduced into the system with a feedback loop for detection of additional levels of
offspring (see Section 3.4).
3.2.2 Strong Node Concept
The strong node concept provides a framework for the phantom components to be utilized to
detect worm andDDoS attack behaviorwithin network traffic flows. Using the spectral graph
theory techniques discussed in Chapter 2, the strong node concept is derived from analysis
of the dual-basis with specific emphasis given to the relationship between an eigenvector
element {8, 9 and its corresponding eigenvalue _ 9 .
Given Equation 2.5, Equations 2.7 can be rewritten as
0 = 38{8, 9 − (
=∑
:=1









08,:{:, 9 | : 6= 8), (3.3)
where 38 is the degree associated with the 8Cℎ node [85]. Keeping all other variables constant,
38 and _ 9 provide information on the behavior of {8, 9 . The magnitude of the scaling factor
1
38−_ 9 in Equation 3.3 is larger in lower eigenspectrum indices for smaller degree nodes
than larger degree nodes. Conversely, the magnitude of 1
38−_ 9 from Equation 3.3 is larger
in higher eigenspectrum indices for larger degree nodes than smaller degree nodes. An
example of this is shown in Figure 3.9 for a network containing six nodes with 31 ≤ 32 ≤
33 ≤ 34 ≤ 35 ≤ 36. In this example, 31 has the largest scaling factor in _2, and 36 has the
largest scaling factor in _6.
Figure 3.9. Visual number line depiction of effects of the magnitude of the
scaling factor 1
38−_ 9 from Equation 3.3 on the magnitude of {8, 9 for a network
of six nodes where 31 ≤ 32 ≤ 33 ≤ 34 ≤ 35 ≤ 36. Source: [86].
As depicted in Figure 4.10, we expand this line of thought to develop a mathematical
foundation for the strong node concept, which directly connects node strength (or con-
nectivity) to the eigenvector magnitude value across the eigenspectrum. The summation
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(∑=
:=1 08:{: 9 | : 6= 8) from Equation 3.3 is directly influenced by the degree (or connec-
tivity) of the connected neighbors of the node. As a result, larger degree nodes have more
terms in the summation than smaller degree nodes. Each term in the summation is directly
scaled by the eigenvector value of the neighboring node, which in turn is being scaled by
the scaling factor 1
38−_ 9 of that node. Using deductive reasoning,
1
38−_ 9 appears to be the
dominating parameter in Equation 3.3. Consequently, the effects depicted in Figure 4.10 for
a six-node network should hold true across all networks and graphs.
Figure 3.10. Depiction of the strong node concept using the magnitude of
{8, 9 for a six node network with 31 ≤ 32 ≤ 33 ≤ 34 ≤ 35 ≤ 36. Source: [86].
To summarize, the strong node concept relates node connectivity directly to its eigenvector
magnitude value (or nodal influence) across the eigenspectrum. Nodes that are strongly
connected will have larger nodal influence in higher eigenspectrum indices while nodes that
are weakly connected will have larger nodal influence in lower eigenspectrum indices [23].
3.2.3 Detection Process
The detection process utilizes the strong node concept and phantom components to develop
thresholdswithin the eigenspectrum for the purpose of detectingmalicious behavior/patterns
within the network traffic flows. While most applications of spectral graph theory focus on
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analysis of static networks [87], [88], the strong node concept detection process compares
eigenspectrum changes over time for the purpose of analyzing real-world dynamic networks.
The detection process begins with the attachment of both the worm and DDoS phantom
components to 1 to produce 1?ℎ0=, and the worm phantom component to 2 to produce
2
?ℎ0=
. The second-levelmatrices, 2 and 2?ℎ0=, are employed as part of the system feedback
loop (see Section 3.4) to attain second-level offspring of a worm attack. Eigendecomposition





, to produce the eigenvalue and eigenvector matrices where < = ()|>A<
?ℎ0=C><
+ 1) +
32><?()>(?ℎ0=C>< + 1), )
|>A<
?ℎ0=C><
is the number of offspring nodes in the worm phantom
component, )>(
?ℎ0=C><
is the number of offspring nodes in the DDoS phantom component,














in at least one of the =× 1 vectors of + (i.e., in one eigenspectrum index). The phantom
eigenvalue _?ℎ0= is the eigenvalue associated with the highest eigenspectrum index that
a phantom component node has {?A8
8, 9
. The _?ℎ0= is utilized to develop an eigenspectrum
threshold )484= in the dual-basis. Since an eigenvalue can have a multiplicity greater than
one, )484= is established in the lowest eigenspectrum index that has an eigenvalue equal to
_?ℎ0=. The )484= is then utilized to detect threshold crossings. A threshold crossing occurs
when a node is detected as having {?A8
8, 9
in an eigenspectrum index greater than or equal to
the )484= established by the phantom component. Due to the strong node concept, nodes
that have a connectivity greater than or equal to the most connected node in the phantom
component will have a {?A8
8, 9
in an eigenspectrum index greater than or equal to )484=.
The strong node concept detection process is demonstrated using the filtered TDG shown
in Figure 3.11. In this TDG, the black components represent normal traffic flows, the
green component represents the phantom component utilized for detection, and the red
36
components represent worm attack traffic. The phatom component has )|>A<
?ℎ0=C><
= 2. Nodes
5, 9, 11, and 15 are infected by a worm and are exhibiting worm attack behavior. The
undirected, phantom adjacency matrix of this TDG,
1?ℎ0= =

0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0

, (3.5)
is utilized to form &, which is decomposed into the eigenvalues and eigenvectors depicted
in Figure 3.12. The largest eigenspectrum index that the phantom component has {?A8
8, 9
is 17
(indicated by the green box), which has an associated _?ℎ0= = 3. The smallest eigenspectrum
index that has an eigenvalue equal to _?ℎ0= is 16. As a result, )484= = 16 (indicated by the
dashed green line). All nodes that have {?A8
8, 9
in an eigenspectrum index greater than or equal
to )484= are detected as anomalous, or in this case infected by a worm (indicated by the
red boxes). The nodes detected as exhibiting worm attack behavior (nodes 5, 9, 11, and 15,
indicated by red boxes) are in fact the worm infected nodes from the TDG in Figure 3.11.
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Figure 3.11. Example TDG containing a phantom component (green), nor-





































































































































A node detected as anomalous by the strong node concept detection process is considered
the parent node of the attack behavior. For each node detected as anomalous, the other
nodes that have |{8, 9 |> 0 in the same eigenspectrum index are considered its offspring. For
example, in the strong node concept detection process shown in Figure 3.12, the offspring of
node 5 are nodes 6, 7, and 8. Comparing these results to Figure 3.11, the strong node concept
detection process accurately identifies the worm infected nodes and potential victims of the
worm infected nodes.
When a threshold crossing is detected by the spectral graph detection, the node (or nodes)





are sent to the classification component to determine if they
are part of a DDoS attack or worm attack.
3.3 Classification
The classification component shown in Figure 3.13 is responsible for classifying detected
anomalous network behaviors and providing that classification and additional known attack
parameters to the response component. The dual-degree matrix, the detected anomalous
node(s) and offspring from 1
?ℎ0=
, the detected anomalous parent and offspring node(s)
from 2
?ℎ0=
, and the anomalous parent and offspring node(s) stored in the system memory
component are inputs for the classification component. The classification component utilizes
these inputs to perform the following functions: anomaly classification and attack parameter
determination. The outputs of this component include the victim, potential attackers, and
estimated attack rate of a DDoS attack, and the first-level and second-level infected nodes,
the first-level and second-level potential victim nodes, and estimated scan rate of a worm
attack. In the remainder of this section, we first discuss the anomaly classification process
before describing the outputted attack parameters.
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Figure 3.13. Functional processes of the classification component.
3.3.1 Anomaly Classification
Since the same phantom component structure is utilized to identify both worm and DDoS
attacks, an additional mechanism must be implemented by the classification component to
distinguish/classify the detected anomalous nodes from the spectral graph detection com-
ponent. The worm and DDoS phantom components are identical in graphical structure but






is the worm phantom component threshold and )>(
?ℎ0=C><
is the DDoS phantom













due to the strong node concept where)|>A<
484=
is the eigenspectrum index
threshold established by the worm phantom component, and )>(
484=
is the eigenspectrum
index threshold established by the DDoS phantom component. As a result, nodes detected
as crossing )>(
484=
could be either a worm attack or a DDoS attack. Additionally, nodes that
cross )|>A<
484=
could be either a worm attack or normal traffic flows that exhibit DDoS-like
behavior. As a result, we developed the dual-degree matrix as a method to distinguish and
classify a worm attack from a DDoS attack.
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The dual-degree matrix produced by the network behavior sensing component contains link
directional information, which is used to differentiate between worm and DDoS attacks.
The dual-degree matrix is a # 5 8;C × 2 matrix in which the first column vector contains
the diagonal elements of 8=, the second column vector contains the diagonal elements
of >DC , and # 5 8;C is the number of filtered nodes that compose the TDG. If anomalous
behavior is detected by an eigenspectrum threshold crossing in the spectral graph detection
component, the classification component compares the in-degree to the out-degree of the
detected anomalous (i.e., parent) node. If the in-degree is greater than the out-degree, then
the node and its offspring are classified as a DDoS attack. If the out-degree is greater than
the in-degree, then the node and its offspring are classified as a worm attack. Since a node
is restrained to a single attack type for the purpose of this work, additional research needs
to be conducted to determine the risk of a mild worm or DDoS attack being masked by a
simultaneous DDoS or worm attack, respectively.
All detected anomalous nodes from 1
?ℎ0=
that are classified as worm attack represent
the first-level graphical attack behavior of a worm. While a single iteration of the spectral
graph detection process provides the necessary information associated with the DDoS attack
behavior, it does not satisfy the graphical worm attack behavior. As a result, the anomalous
node and its offspring are sent to the system memory component to be utilized as a filter
in subsequent iterations of the strong node concept detection process to attain an additional
level of attack behavior (see Section 3.4). It is important to note that the SGCDC system
is designed to detect worm attacks only after the second node is infected. This means that
the first node infected by the worm will not be identified as infected until a second node is
infected and begins exhibiting the worm attack behavior.




and are classified as DDoS attack from the dual-
degree matrix are sent to the next functional process in the classification component to




and are classified as worm attack from the dual-degree matrix are sent to the next functional
process in the classification component to identify the worm attack parameters.
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3.3.2 Attack Parameters
The classification component utilizes the classified anomalies to provide the response com-
ponent with critical attack parameter information for network response. In the case of a
detected and classified DDoS attack, the classification component uses the nodes detected
by the spectral graph detection component to identify the victim (i.e., the detected parent
node) and the potential attackers (i.e., the detected offspring nodes). Additionally, the com-
ponent estimates the DDoS attack rate (i.e., the number of unique communication links per
window time unit associated with the detected attacked node), defined as
'4BC>( =
#> 5 5 B?A8=
!|
, (3.6)
where #> 5 5 B?A8= is the total number of offspring nodes associated with the detected parent
node.
In the case of a detected and classified worm attack, the classification component uses the
nodes stored in memory and the nodes detected by the spectral graph detection component
to identify the infected nodes (i.e., detected parent nodes) and the potential victims (i.e.,
detected offspring nodes) of the worm attack. Additionally, the component estimates the
worm spread rate (i.e., the number of unique communication links per window time unit
associated with the detected infected node), defined as
'4BC|>A< =
#%1
> 5 5 B?A8=
+ #%2




> 5 5 B?A8=
is the total number of offspring nodes associated with the first-level parent
node, and #%2
> 5 5 B?A8=
is the total number of offspring nodes associated with the second-level
parent node.
3.4 System Memory
The systemmemory component is responsible for storing information on classified first-level
worm attack behavior, which is utilized by both the network behavior sensing component
and the classification component. The system memory component stores information on
both the parent and offspring nodes of a classified first-level worm attack for a set period of
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time C;>. The length of C;> is externally determined by the network administrator, which is
discussed in Section 3.6.
In order to accurately differentiate and identify worm attack behavior from potentially nor-
mal traffic flows, two levels of offspring must be exhibited and identified. To attain the
second-level offspring, the first-level offspring must be utilized as a filter in subsequent
iterations of the SGCDC process. The implementation of the feedback loop in the SGCDC
system as shown in Figure 3.14 allows the system memory component to share its stored
information with the network behavior sensing component. For the length of C;>, informa-
tion on detected anomalous offspring nodes are sent to the network sensing component to
be utilized by the behavior filter to find TDGs containing second-level offspring (i.e., for
2
38A
). This process allows the single-level phantom component (discussed in Section 3.2.1)
to be utilized to detect additional levels of offspring.
Figure 3.14. Feedback loop within the SGCDC system.
For implementation of the proposed SGCDC system, a single feedback cycle is utilized to
detect second-level offspring; however, the feedback loop could be implemented for addi-
tional iterations to detect additional levels of offspring. While this may potentially decrease
the number of false alarms in the system, additional iterations increase the computational
costs and length of time for detection.
The system memory component is also responsible for providing information to the clas-
sification component to correlate the first-level worm attack behavior to the second-level
worm attack behavior and to determine additional attack parameters. For the length of C;>,




The response component is responsible for selecting the appropriate network actions based
on the attack parameters outputted by the classification component. These attack parameters
provide the SGCDC system with critical information to defend the network against the
detected worm and/or DDoS attack(s). The response component could be implemented in a
variety of ways depending on the needs or desires of the network administrator. For example,
the response component could represent a user interface where the attack parameters are
sent to a human monitoring the network to make decisions and take action to defend the
network. The attack parameters also provide the opportunity for the response component
to be a module with pre-programmed network responses to attain quicker response times.
Regardless of the implementation, the response component takes action to defend the
network against the detected and classified attacks.
3.6 External Input Parameters
There are four external, input parameters critical to the SGCDC system that must be
determined by the network administrator as part of the system initialization: !|, )|>A<?ℎ0=C><,
)>(
?ℎ0=C><
, C;>. The !| controls the number of traffic flows being processed by the system
and should be as small as possible to decrease the computational complexity and to provide
quicker identification and classification of attacks. The )|>A<
?ℎ0=C><
represents the number of
offspring in the worm phantom component, and)>(
?ℎ0=C><
represents the number of offspring




should be as large as possible
to keep benign network traffic below )484=, yet small enough that worm and DDoS attack
traffic will still be detected. To ensure )|>A<
?ℎ0=C><
is small enough to detect worm attack traffic,
the relationship given by
)|>A<?ℎ0=C>< < 'B20= × !| (3.8)
must hold true where 'B20= is the worm attack scan rate defined as the number of SYN
packets sent per unit time to unique hosts. Similarly, to ensure )>(
?ℎ0=C><
is small enough to
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detect DDoS attack traffic,
)>(?ℎ0=C>< < '0CC02: × !| (3.9)
must hold true where '0CC02: is the DDoS attack rate defined as the number of unique nodes
sending SYN packets per unit time. Finally, C;> is a parameter that is solely used for worm
attack detection and classification. The C;> must be chosen such that
C;> > C) − C(.# (3.10)
where C) is the time when the second-level parent node sends a number of SYN packets
equal to )|>A<
?ℎ0=C><
in the defined !|, and C(.# is the time when the second-level parent node
first received the SYN-only packet of the TCP three-way handshake from the first-level
parent node. In other words, C;> must be greater than the sum of the infection time C8= 5 42C
and the time it takes to send a number SYN packets equal to )|>A<
?ℎ0=C><
. The initialization of
these four external parameters by the network administrator directly impacts the detection
accuracy and false alarm rate of the SGCDC system (see Chapter 4).
All simulations in this work use one instantiation of each of these external, input parameters;
however, when implementing the system in hardware and software, multiple instantiations of





and/or C;> values may be implemented to provide detection against both
slow-spreading and fast-spreading attacks. For such cases, a confidence level mechanism
may need to be introduced into the system to differentiate between attacks detected by the
different parameters.
In summary, this chapter introduced our solution approach for worm and DDoS detection
using spectral graph theory tools. We proposed a system that requires external input and
performs detection using the strong node concept and phantom components. The next
chapter explores the theoretical false alarms for the proposed system under ideal network
conditions for a given set of external, input parameters.
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CHAPTER 4:
Theoretical False Alarm Rates
The spectral graph detection approach employed in the proposed SGCDC system is sus-
ceptible to false alarms. In this chapter, we examine the proposed system states and state
transition probabilities to develop theoretical upper bounds on the system false alarm rates
under ideal network conditions. We begin by describing state models for both the proposed
system and the individual nodes within the system. From the two models, equations are
developed to define the system and node false alarm rates. The equations require a PDF of
network SYN traffic, so we develop a novel mixture modeling methodology and propose
a novel Lévy-impulse model to describe network SYN traffic. Utilizing the Lévy-impulse
model and false alarm equations, the theoretical upper bounds are then defined for the
system false alarm rates. Finally, nodal state visitation is explored to provide an addition
layer of theoretical analysis on the length of time between false alarms.
This chapter includesmaterial adapted fromwork to be published by the author. Specifically,
Section 4.3 contains some revised material from “A Novel Lévy-Impulse Mixture Based
Connection Model for Computer Network Traffic” by Jamie Safar, Murali Tummala, and
John McEachen, to be published in the 14th International Conference on Signal Processing
and Communication Systems.
4.1 System State Model Specifications
To determine the proposed SGCDC system theoretical false alarm rates, a system state
model is developed to describe the transitional probabilities that result in the detection of
an attack. The proposed SGCDC system is modeled using the two-state absorbing Markov
chain shown in Figure 4.1, where the first state B1 represents normal, and the second state
B2 represents attacked. The state transition probabilities are defined as ?8, 9 where 8 is the
current state and 9 is the new state [89].
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Figure 4.1. System state model for the proposed SGCDC system.
The system initially resides in B1 and will remain in B1 as long as an attack is not detected.
The system will transition from B1 to B2 if either a worm attack or DDoS attack is detected
from the filtered TDGs. Once an attack is detected, the system remains in B2 until network
intervention stops the attack and restores the system to its normal state [90]. The attack
response and recovery efforts are variable and typically occur on a different time scale [91]
compared to the proposed system detection and classification process. As a result, B2 is
modeled as an absorbing state.
To determine ?1,2 of the system state model, the probability of worm detection %(|>A<)
and the probability of DDoS detection %(>() must be defined. For the purposes of this
dissertation, we assume that the probability that any two nodes communicate is equally













is the worm detection scaling factor defined as
2|>A<34C =




|>A< is the event describing the detection of a worm attack, (=8CG is the number of SYN
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packets transmitted by node 8 in the given !|, and 5 !|(.# (G) is the PDF of SYN traffic for
the given !|. The worm detection scaling factor is a result of the three conditions that must
be met for worm traffic to be detected. In Appendix A.1, these three conditions are defined










where >( is the event describing the detection of a DDoS attack. See Appendix A.1 for
a complete derivation of %(|>A<) and %(>(). From equations A.6 and 4.3, ?1,2 for
the system state model is
?
B~B
1,2 = %(|>A<) + %(>(). (4.4)
In the SGCDC system, a system false alarm B~B
5 0;B4
occurs if the system transition from B1







| no worm or DDoS attack in network) = ?B~B1,2 . (4.5)
This means that the system false alarm rate is directly dependent on the set of external, input
parameters (!|, )|>A<?ℎ0=C><, )
>(
?ℎ0=C><
, and C;>) and the PDF of network SYN traffic.
4.2 Nodal State Model Specifications
While the system state model provides an overarching depiction of the detection process, it
does not provide any insight on the intermediary steps resulting from the implementation of
the feedback loop to detect second-level offspring of worm attacks. As a result, a nodal state
model is developed to describe node transition probabilities that result in the detection of
an attack. This model is then utilized to develop an expression that describes the probability
of a node being identified as attacked when no attack exists.
Each node monitored by the SGCDC system is independently modeled using the three-state
absorbing Markov chain shown in Figure 4.2 where B1 represents normal, B2 represents
abnormal, and the third state B3 represents attacked.While each node has its own independent
model, dependency exists between the models with respect to state transitions.
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Figure 4.2. Nodal state model for the proposed SGCDC system.
The node initially resides in B1 and will remain in B1 unless one of three conditions is met:
1) a DDoS attack is detected, 2) the node sends a number of SYN packets greater than or
equal to )|>A<
?ℎ0=C><
, and one of its offspring subsequently sends a number of SYN greater
than or equal to )|>A<
?ℎ0=C><
while it is being stored in system memory, or 3) the node receives
a SYN packet from a node that sent a number of SYN packets greater than or equal to
)|>A<
?ℎ0=C><
. The combination of condition one and two results in a transition from B1 to B3. For
condition one, the node is identified as the victim of a DDoS attack, which has a probability
equal to %(>() as defined in Equation 4.3. For condition two, the node is identified as
a first-level parent of a worm attack, which has a probability equal to %(|>A<) as defined
in Equation A.6. Combining the probabilities, the probability of a node transitioning from
B1 to B3 is given by
?=>341,3 = %(>() + %(|>A<). (4.6)
For condition three, the node becomes a first-level offspring of a potential worm attack and
transitions from B1 to B2. Assuming a uniform distribution for the probability that any two












If a node in B1 does not transition to B2 or B3, then it remains in B1. Thus, the probability of
a node remaining in B1 is given by
?1,1 = 1 − ?1,2 − ?1,3. (4.8)
From B2, a node will transition to B3 if it sends a number of SYN packets greater than or
equal to )|>A<
?ℎ0=C><










A node in B2 will transition back to B1 if two conditions are met: 1) all other nodes that send
a number of SYN packets greater than or equal to )|>A<
?ℎ0=C><
do not send this node a SYN
while it is being stored in system memory as an offspring node, and 2) if the node does not
send a number of SYN packets greater than or equal to )|>A<
?ℎ0=C><
while it is being stored
in system memory. Assuming a uniform value of (=8CG for all nodes found above )|>A<484= , the































If a node in B2 does not transition to B1 or B3, then it remains in B2. Thus, the probability of
a node remaining in B2 is given by





Once an attack is detected, the node remains in B3 until network intervention stops the attack
and restores the system to its normal state [90]. As a result, B3 is modeled as an absorbing
state. The derivations of ?=>341,3 , ?
=>34
1,2 , and ?
=>34
2,1 are provided in Appendix A.2.
In the SGCDC system, a nodal false alarm  5 0;B4
=>34
occurs if any node transitions to B3 when
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no worm or DDoS attack exists on the node. As a result, the probability of of a nodal false
alarm can be expressed as
%(=>345 0;B4 | no worm or DDoS attack on the node) = ?1,3 + (?1,2 × ?2,3). (4.12)
This means a node false alarm rate is also directly dependent on the set of external, input
parameters (!|, )|>A<?ℎ0=C><, )
>(
?ℎ0=C><
, and C;>) and the PDF of network SYN traffic.
4.3 SYN Traffic Distribution Model
In order to further analyze the theoretical false alarm rates of the proposed SGCDC system,
the PDF of network SYN trafficmust be determined.We begin this section by describing the
characteristics of SYN traffic. Next, we show that traditional distributions do not accurately
describe the SYN traffic behavior. Since none of the previously proposed models that we
reviewed in literature fit the SYN traffic characteristics, we develop an innovative mixture
model methodology to develop the novel Lévy-impulse model for network SYN traffic. We
conclude this section with an analysis of the accuracy of the proposed Lévy-impulse model.
4.3.1 SYN Traffic Characteristics
To develop an understanding of the behavior and characteristics of network SYN traffic,
we utilize a dataset containing one hour of real-world traffic flows collected in 2013 from
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) network. For the remainder of this dissertation, we
refer to the SYN traffic flows within this collected dataset as the NPS2013 dataset. The
NPS2013 dataset contains 1341 nodes, and the overall traffic has an average SYN rate
of approximately 16.17 packets per second. The number of SYN packets sent by each
individual node to unique destination addresses for varying !| is shown in Figure 4.3. The
data distributions across the different !| all exhibit a high zero-probability and a very long
tail. While this work focuses on SYN packets sent to unique destination addresses to support
the worm and DDoS attack behavior modeled by the phantom component, it is important to
note that similar results are observed whenwe do not constrain the data to unique destination
addresses.
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Figure 4.3. Probability of a node in the NPS2013 dataset sending a specified
number of SYN packets to unique destination addresses for various !|.
Source: [92].
4.3.2 Distribution Fit of Traditional Models
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, many real-world network traffic features cannot be
accurately modeled using traditional distribution models, such as exponential, gamma, nor-
mal, and Rayleigh [36]–[38]. Utilizing the SYN packets transmitted to unique destination
addresses in the NPS2013 dataset, we evaluate and compare the fit of these traditional
distribution models using the “fitmethis" program [93] for MATLAB. This program utilizes
MATLAB built-in maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) function [94] to find the best
distribution fit for the data vector under consideration. The output includes both the distri-
bution parameters and log-likelihood values for the continuous and discrete distributions
available in MATLAB MLE function.
The log-likelihood results of the exponential, gamma, normal and Rayleigh distribution fits
for the transmitted SYN traffic in NPS2013 dataset are listed in Table 4.1. The exponential
was suggested as the "best-fit" for all of the windows.
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Table 4.1. Log-likelihoods of MLE fits of various commonly used network
modeling distributions fitted to the NPS2013 SYN dataset. Source: [92].
!| (sec) Exponential Gamma Normal Rayleigh
1 18010000 -217600 3601000 -2682000
5 2271000 -118800 -168300 -399700
15 449200 -80020 -315900 -109000
30 125900 -62520 -253700 -60220
45 49480 -52060 -196600 -46600
60 17970 -45830 -165200 -39400
75 3344 -40930 -139600 -35670
90 -5020 -37240 -124300 -32680
120 -13340 -32360 -102200 -29280
180 -16540 -25910 -74210 -22450
240 -16690 -22220 -60530 -18900
300 -15960 -19420 -51090 -17140
Yet, when the suggested exponential distribution is compared to the NPS2013 dataset, the
exponential distribution fails to accurately fit both the high zero-probability and heavy tail of
the SYN traffic. For example, a comparison of the MLE-suggested exponential distribution
and the NPS2013 SYN data for !| = 45 seconds is shown in Figure 4.4. Similar to the
results observed for all !|, the suggested exponential distribution does not accurately reflect
the NPS SYN traffic for !| = 45 seconds; the exponential distribution fails to accurately
reflect the high zero-probability of SYN packets being sent.
From the results, traditional distributions fail to accurately model network SYN traffic
behavior. As a result, we turn to mixture modeling methodologies in an attempt to develop
a more accurate model.
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Figure 4.4. Comparison of the exponential distribution with the MLE-
suggested _ = 0.2319 (blue line) and SYN packet counts from the NPS2013
dataset (red asterisk) for !| = 45 seconds. Source: [92].
4.3.3 Mixture Modeling and the Lévy-Impulse Model
None of the previously proposed models in mixture modeling literature (see Section 1.2.5),
accurately describe the SYN traffic characteristics observed in the NPS2013 dataset. Addi-
tionally, the traditional truncation methodologies proposed in mixture modeling literature
(see Chapters 1 and 2) did not work well for the SYN traffic characteristics since the
zero-count density is consistently greater than the non-zero transmission counts by a few
orders of magnitude. As a result, we propose an innovative truncation methodology where
an impulse is combined with a heavy-tailed distribution to develop a novel mixture model.
In accordance with this methodology, the windowed NPS2013 SYN data is split into two
groups to account for both the high zero-probability and the heavy tail. An impulse is ap-
plied to the high-zero probability data, and the heavy-tailed data is analyzed for “best-fit.”
The results are then combined and normalized to form the mixture model.
The first group contains the data associated with SYN transmission counts equal to zero
(i.e., the data associated with the high zero-probability). An impulse located at zero captures
the high zero-probability of SYN traffic that appears to skew a single-distribution model.
The zero-count probabilities for the first group for various !| are shown in Figure 4.5 as
red asterisks. We then apply MATLAB polynomial curve fitting tools to this data using the
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“polyfit” function [94] to determine the polynomial coefficients of the least-squares best-fit
to the data [95]. As a result, the probability of a node sending zero SYN packets for a given
window length is given by
%(#!|
(.#
= 0) = −0.02261!0.4528| + 1.021, (4.13)
as shown by the blue line in Figure 4.5. Equation 4.13 provides the scaling factor of the
impulse for the proposed Lévy-impulse model.




















Figure 4.5. Curve-fit (blue line) for the probability of a node to send zero SYN
packets within a defined window using NPS 2013 SYN data (red asterisk).
Source: [92].
The second group contains the remaining SYN data (i.e., the data associated with the long-
tail). Utilizing the “fitmethis” program, the log-likelihood results of various distributions
applied to the second group of data is listed in Table 4.2 for various !|. From the log-
likelihood results, the stable distribution is suggested as the “best-fit” for all !| tested.
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Table 4.2. Log likelihoods of various commonly used network modeling dis-
tributions fitted to the second group of NPS2013 SYN data (data excluding
zero-count transmissions). Source: [92].
!| (sec) Stable Gamma Weibull Exponential Gaussian
1 71870 -26660 -35380 -43750 -47750
5 0 -26980 -30240 -31700 -45450
15 20300 -24480 -25880 -26080 -41100
30 6389 -22230 -22750 -22750 -38130
45 -4813 -19940 -20170 -20200 -34170
60 -4833 -18540 -18600 -18670 -31690
75 -6258 -17250 -17230 -17330 -29350
90 -4554 -16290 -16190 -16320 -27520
120 -8482 -14840 -14650 -14840 -25050
180 -6876 -12540 -12310 -12540 -21140
240 -5772 -11120 -10870 -11130 -18790
300 0 -10040 -9794 -10050 -16830
As discussed in Chapter 2, the stable distribution contains four parameters: U, V, W, and
` [39]. The MLE-suggested values of these stable distribution parameters for various !|
are shown in Figure 4.6 where the blue asterisks are the suggested parameter values and the
red dashed lines are our suggested fits. For U and V, no discernable trend exists in relation
to !|; however, the majority of the !| have an U parameter value close to 0.5 and a V
parameter value close to 1.0. These parameter results align with Lévy distribution, a special
case of the stable distribution (see Chapter 2). Applying MATLAB polynomial curve fitting




= 0.001244!| + 0.09255, (4.14)
and the parameter value of ` for a given !| is obtained as
`
!|
= 0.0007453!| + 1.047. (4.15)
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(d) ` parameter values
Figure 4.6. Parameters of the stable distribution suggested by the “fitmethis”
program for the second group of NPS2013 SYN data (data excluding zero-
count transmissions). Source: [92].
Continuing with our proposed methodology, the Lévy-impulse model is formed by first
concatenating the result from the two groups of data and then normalizing the distribution
to ensure the law of total probability is not violated. As a result, the PDF of the proposed































This model accurately accounts for the dominant features (i.e., high zero-probability and
heavy tail) exhibited by network SYN traffic.
4.3.4 Accuracy of the LI Model
To demonstrate the accuracy of the proposed Lévy-impulse model in characterizing network
SYN traffic, we analyze the SYN packets sent by nodes and the SYN packets received
by nodes for two different real-world network datasets and one synthesized dataset: the
NPS2013 dataset, the Measurement and Analysis on the WIDE Internet (MAWI) 20151114
trace [96] (referred to as the MAWI2015 dataset in the remainder of this dissertation), and
the 2009 DARPA Scalable Network Monitoring Program Traffic 2009-11-05 trace [97]
(referred to as the DARPA2009 dataset in the remainder of this dissertation).
The MAWI2015 dataset consists of a 15-minute .pcap trace collected between 14:00 and
14:15 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) from the trans-Pacific backbone link between Japan
and the United States, which operates at a rate of approximately one Gbps [96], [98]. Due
to the extremely large amount of data within each trace and the size of the network, we only
analyze the SYN traffic between zero and five seconds (containing 20,820 nodes) for the
results in this section.
The DARPA2009 dataset contains synthesized network traffic between a /16 subnet
(172.28.0.0/16) and the Internet. At some point within the trace (we estimate sometime
between 90 and 100 seconds from visual analysis of the .pcap data), a SYN flood DDoS
attack occurs on IP address 172.28.4.7 from approximately 100 different IPs [99]. As a
result, we utilize the traffic between zero and 90 seconds (containing 8,807 nodes) in this
section for SYN traffic analysis.
To evaluate the accuracy of the Lévy-impulse model against transmitted SYN traffic, the
datasets are windowed for various !| and analyzed for the number of SYN packets sent
to unique destination addresses by each individual node. The results for !| = 5 and
!| = 30 seconds are shown in Figure 4.7, and the results for !| = 90 seconds are shown in
Figure 4.8. Since only five seconds of the MAWI2015 dataset are analyzed, the MAWI2015
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results are only shown in Figure 4.7(a). For all !|, the Lévy-impulse model accurately
characterizes the transmitted SYN data for the NPS2013 and DARPA2009 datasets. For the
MAWI2015 dataset, the Lévy-impulse model accurately models the body of the data but
slightly underestimates the tail by approximately 10−4.
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(a) SYN transmission for !| = 5 seconds
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(b) SYN transmission for !| = 30 seconds
Figure 4.7. Accuracy of LI model for SYN traffic sent from nodes in the
NPS2013, MAWI2015, and DARPA2009 datasets for !| = 5 and !| = 30
seconds.
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Figure 4.8. Accuracy of LI model for SYN traffic sent from nodes in the
NPS2013, MAWI2015, and DARPA2009 datasets for !| = 90 seconds.
To evaluate the accuracy of the Lévy-impulse model against received SYN traffic, the
datasets are windowed for various !| and analyzed for the number of SYN packets received
by each individual node from unique sending addresses in each !|. The results for !| = 5
and !| = 30 seconds are shown in Figure 4.9 and the results for !| = 90 seconds are shown
in Figure 4.10. Again, since only five seconds of the MAWI2015 dataset are analyzed, the
MAWI2015 results are only shown in Figure 4.9(a). Similar to the results of the transmitted
SYN traffic, the Lévy-impulse model accurately characterizes the received SYN data for
the NPS2013 and DARPA2009 datasets. It also accurately models the body of the data but
slightly underestimates the tail of the MAWI2015 dataset by approximately 10−4.
The results shown in figures 4.7-4.10 are representative of the results observed across all
evaluated !| values. From these results, the Lévy-impulse model appears to accurately
model both the body and the tail of SYN traffic for smaller networks (i.e., approximately
10,000 nodes or less), but very slightly underestimates the tail for larger networks. This
suggests that larger networks have heavier tails. Since the underestimation appears to be on
the order of approximately 10−4, the error is considered negligible for the purposes of this
work.
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(a) Received SYNs for !| = 5 seconds
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(b) Received SYNs for !| = 30 seconds
Figure 4.9. Accuracy of LI model for SYN traffic received from nodes in the
NPS2013, MAWI2015, and DARPA2009 datasets for !| = 5 and !| = 30
seconds.
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Figure 4.10. Accuracy of LI model for SYN traffic received by nodes in the
NPS2013, MAWI2015, and DARPA2009 datasets for !| = 90 seconds.
4.4 False Alarm Rate Upper Bounds
In this section, the Lévy-impulse model from Section 4.3.4 is combined with the system
and nodal Markov models from Sections 4.1 and 4.2 to analyze the theoretical false alarm
rate of the SGCDC system under ideal network conditions. This analysis is then utilized to
describe both the upper bound and most-likely false alarm rates for both the system and the
nodes being monitored by the system.
4.4.1 Theoretical Rates
The Lévy-impulse model in Equation 4.16 is combined with equations 4.5 and 4.12 to
develop equations describing the theoretical false alarm rate of the SGCDC system. Substi-



























































given no worm or DDoS attack exists. Similarly, Equation 4.12 yields




































































, and C;>) and (=8CG . Utilizing various sets of external, input parameters
that align with the evaluated characteristics of historical worm and DDoS attacks and
support the required external, input parameter relationships described by equations 3.8, 3.9,
and 3.10, the theoretical false alarm rates are analyzed for determining the probability of
occurrence. The probability of occurrence is determined by equations 4.18 and 4.21 for
various G = (=8CG . Given )|>A<?ℎ0=C>< = 5, )
>(
?ℎ0=C><





are shown in Figure 4.11 for various combinations of !| and C;>. Additional results from





), it is far more likely to have a false alarm rate near or equal to zero than
to have a large false alarm rate. Additionally, the probability of a larger false alarm rate
occurring increases as !| and C;> increase. This is due to the increased amount of time
within the system to allow for a node to send and/or receive a number of SYN packets equal




















































































) results for )|>A<
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) results for )|>A<
?ℎ0=C><
= 5 and )>(
?ℎ0=C><
= 15
Figure 4.11. Probability of given system and nodal false alarm rates occurring





15, and the units of !| and C;> are seconds.
Given !| = 1 second, the results of %(B~B5 0;B4) and %(
=>34
5 0;B4
) are shown in Figure 4.12 for
various combinations of C;>, )|>A<?ℎ0=C>< and )
>(
?ℎ0=C><
. Additional results from other sets of
external, input parameters can be found in Appendix B.1. Again, the results demonstrate
that it is far more likely to have a false alarm rate equal to, or near, zero than to have a large
65
false alarm rate. Additionally, for a given !| and C;>, the probability of a larger false alarm




increase. This is due to the increased




that a node must
send and/or receive, respectively, to trigger a false alarm.
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) results for !| = 1 second
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) results for !| = 1 second
Figure 4.12. Probability of given system and nodal false alarm rates occurring
for various sets of external, input parameters, given !| = 1 seconds and the
unit of C;> is seconds.
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4.4.2 Upper Bound
To develop a false alarm rate upper bound from equations 4.18 and 4.21, we assume, for the
purpose of analytical simplicity, that (=8CG is a uniform value for all nodes that are detected
crossing )|>A<
484=
. Given this assumption, the false alarm rate upper bound for any set of
external, input parameters is determined by setting (=8CG = #C>C − 1, which represents a node
sending the maximum number of SYN packets to unique destination addresses within the















































)(#C>C − 1)(C;>)(1 − b!| )2
2c!|
, (4.25)






















































Equations 4.24 through 4.27 are utilized to evaluate the theoretical false alarm rate upper
bounds for various sets of external, input parameters. For evaluation purposes, the number





results are shown in Figure 4.13 for various
combinations of C;>, )|>A<?ℎ0=C>< and )
>(
?ℎ0=C><
that align with evaluated characteristics of
numerous historical worm and DDoS attacks and support the required external, input
parameter relationships described by equations 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10.
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Figure 4.13. Theoretical upper bound false alarm rates for NPS2013 dataset









increase as !| and/or C;>









), if !| or C;> increase, the amount of time within the system to allow for a node















that a node must send and/or receive, respectively, to trigger a false alarm also
decreases, making a false alarm more probable.
4.4.3 Most-Likely Rates
To determine the most-likely false alarm rate from equations 4.18 and 4.21, we assume
for the purpose of analytical simplicity that (=8CG is a uniform value for all nodes that are
detected crossing )|>A<
484=
. Given this assumption, the most-likely false alarm rate for any set
of external, input parameters is determined by setting (=8CG = )|>A<?ℎ0=C><, which represents a
node sending the minimum number of SYN packets to unique destination addresses while
still being detected as crossing )|>A<
484=
. Thus, the most-likely false alarm rate for the system

















































)(C;>)(1 − b!| )2
2c!|
, (4.29)





























































Equations 4.28 through 4.31 are utilized to evaluate the most-likely false alarm rates for
various sets of external, input parameters. For evaluation purposes, the number of nodes
in the network is set to 1,341, which is the total number of nodes in the NPS2013 dataset.
The B~B
!8:4;~0;B4
results are shown in Figure 4.14 and the =>34
!8:4;~0;B4
results are shown in
Figure 4.15 for various combinations of external input parameters that align with evaluated
characteristics of numerous historical worm and DDoS attacks, and support the required
external, input parameter relationships described by equations 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10.





































































Figure 4.14. System theoretical most-likely false alarm rates for NPS2013











































































Figure 4.15. Nodal theoretical most-likely false alarm rates for NPS2013








increase as !| and/or C;> increase
because the amount of time within the system to allow for a node to send and/or receive


















that a node must send and/or receive, respectively, to trigger a false alarm
also decreases.
4.5 State Visitation Analysis
To provide an additional layer of analysis to the theoretical false alarm rates, the state
diagrams representing the proposed SGCDC system are analyzed for the expected state
visitation count to determine the theoretical length of time between false alarms. Utilizing
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the system and nodal state diagrams in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively, state visitation
analysis provides a theoretical count of the number of times each of the non-absorbing (i.e.,
transient) states are visited prior to absorption. Since a single visitation occurs during each
!|, the length of time between false alarms can be determined from the total number of
transient state visitations prior to absorption.
In accordance with [89], the state visitation count is determined by the fundamental matrix
# 5 D=3 of an absorbing Markov chain, defined as
# 5 D=3 = (=B−1 −&8), (4.32)
where &8 is the (=B − 1) × (=B − 1) upper left partition of the probability transition matrix
%CA0=B [89], %CA0=B is the =B × =B matrix containing all ?8, 9 of the absorbing Markov chain
[100], =B is the identity matrix of size (=B − 1) × (=B − 1), and =B is the number of states in
the absorbing Markov chain [89].












where ?B~B1,2 is defined in Equation 4.4. The 1 × 1 upper left partition of %
B~B




= 1 − ?B~B1,2 , (4.34)



































where ?=>341,2 is defined in Equation 4.7, ?
=>34
1,3 is defined in Equations 4.6, ?
=>34
2,1 is defined
in Equations 4.10, ?=>342,2 is defined in Equation 4.11, and ?
=>34
2,3 is defined in Equation 4.9.
The 2 × 2 upper left partition of %=>34CA0=B is defined as
&=>348 =
[










and the nodal fundamental matrix is given by




As a result, the nodal theoretical length of time between false alarms can be shown to be











where = 5 D=3
8, 9







, the length of time between false alarms is directly dependent on
(
=8










for various sets of external, input parameters is listed in Table 4.3 using the 1341 node




occur when !| = 1 second,
C;> = 10 second, )|>A<?ℎ0=C>< = 10, and )
>(
?ℎ0=C><
= 30. These results indicate that the length of







Table 4.3. Example theoretical times between false alarms for SGCDC system
using the 1341 node network from the NPS2013 dataset.











1 10 5 15 5 2.56 2.96
1 40 5 15 5 2.31 2.95
1 100 5 15 5 1.95 2.92
1 10 10 30 10 3.64 4.34
1 40 10 30 10 3.21 4.32
1 100 10 30 10 2.59 4.29
2 10 5 15 5 0.77 0.95
2 40 5 15 5 0.59 0.93
2 100 5 15 5 0.40 0.91
2 10 10 30 10 1.07 1.39
2 40 10 30 10 0.77 1.38
2 100 10 30 10 0.50 1.35
In summary, this chapter explored the theoretical system and nodal false alarms rates for the
proposed SGCDC using absorbingMarkov chains. Analysis of the false alarm rates required
the development of the novel Lévy-impulse model to describe network SYN traffic. The
absorbing Markov chains were also analyzed for state visitation count to determine the
theoretical length of time between false alarms. While it is important to understand the
theoretical system performance and limitations under ideal network conditions, it is just as
important to understand how adverse network conditions affect system performance. The
proposed SGCDC system is susceptible to network noise and congestion, which may impact
both detection and false alarm rates. The effect of these adverse conditions on the spectral
graph detection component of the proposed system is examined in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5:
Detection among Noise and Congestion
In this chapter, we examine how perturbations in the adjacency matrix impact the dual-basis
to develop an understanding of how network noise and congestion affect the spectral graph
detection mechanism employed in the proposed SGCDC system. We begin by describing
three traffic scenarios that would impact the ability of the proposed system to detect an
attack. We find that only one case requires further analysis of the dual-basis with respect to
perturbations in the adjacency matrix to determine the impact on the SGCDC system. In
support of that case, we then explore the impact of adjacency matrix perturbation on the
dual-basis using the eigenvector and eigenvalue perturbation theorems discussed in Chapter
2. Next, we propose a novel method of analyzing the perturbation of the eigenvectors of the
nodal basis. We conclude this chapter with a discussion on how the perturbation findings of
the dual-basis affect the proposed SGCDC system.
5.1 Network Perturbation Cases
In this section, we describe computer network scenarios in which network traffic is im-
pacted by either congestion or the presence of noise resulting in a perturbation of the data
utilized by the proposed SGCDC system to perform detection. From the proposed system
operating under ideal network conditions as depicted in Figure 5.1, there are three network
congestion/noise scenarios that will affect the SGCDC system: 1) all traffic flows are not
received, 2) some of the traffic flows are received, and 3) errors exist within some of the
traffic flows.
In context of the network in Figure 5.1, severe network congestion or a cyber attack directed
at the SGCDC system can result in the system not receiving all of the traffic flows in the
network as shown in Figure 5.2. In this scenario, all nodes will have {?A8
8, 9
in an eigenspectrum




. If no attack is
present, then this scenario has no effect on the system; however, if a worm or DDoS attack
exists within the network, the SGCDC system will be unable to detect the attack.
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Figure 5.1. SGCDC system operating under ideal network conditions.
Figure 5.2. SGCDC system operating under severe network congestion or
cyber attack resulting in the system not receiving all traffic flows.
In context of the network in Figure 5.1, network congestion or a cyber attack directed at
the SGCDC system can result in the system receiving only a portion of the traffic flows as
shown in Figure 5.3. If a worm attack exists within the network, then one of three cases
result from the SGCDC system receiving only a portion of the traffic flows. First, all of the
flows of the infected node and the flows associated with the nodes that the infected node
sent a SYN to are not received. Consequently, the SGCDC system is unable to detect the
infected node. Second, the of the infected node flows are received and/or all of the flows
associated with the nodes that the infected node sent a SYN to are received. This case has
no effect on the ability of the system to detect the infected node. Third, the flows of the
infected node are not received and only a portion of the flows associated with the nodes
that the infected node sent a SYN to are received. For this case, the ability of the SGCDC
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system to detect the infected node is dependent on the number of node flows received and
requires further analysis on the effects of adjacency matrix perturbation on the dual-basis.
Figure 5.3. SGCDC system operating under network congestion or cyber
attack resulting in the system not receiving a portion of the traffic flows.
If a DDoS attack exists within the network in Figure 5.3, then one of three cases result
from the SGCDC system receiving only a portion of the traffic flows. First, the flows of the
attacked node and all of the flows of the attacking nodes are not received. Consequently,
the SGCDC system is unable to detect the attacked node. Second, the flows of the attacked
node are received and/or all of the flows of the attacking nodes are received. This case has
no affect on the ability of the system to detect the attacked node. Third, the flows of the
attacked node are not received and only a portion of the flows of the attacking nodes are
received. Similar to the worm attack, the ability of the SGCDC system to detect the attacked
node in this case is dependent on the number of node flows received and requires further
analysis on the effects of adjacency matrix perturbation on the dual-basis.
In context of the network in Figure 5.1, noise within the network results in bit errors (i.e.,
flipped bits) in either the payload or frame check sequence. While typical TCP protocols
would disregard data with errors, we analyze both the typical TCP response of distrusting
the data and the atypical response of trusting the data to provide comprehensive analysis
of the system. We also recognize the possibility that a case exists where the TCP protocols
might find no errors even though bit errors exist, which would produce synonymous results
as trusting data with errors. Given this understanding, the SGCDC system receives all of
the traffic flows but has to decide whether to trust the data contained in certain flows, as
depicted in Figure 5.4. The system can either accept that errors exist and keep all flows for
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analysis or not trust the flows that contain errors and disregard those flows.
Figure 5.4. SGCDC system operating under network noise resulting in bit
errors in the payload.
If the proposed SGCDC system is initialized to trust the data, then three cases exist with
respect to errors. First, errors exist and are ignored in the section of the payload describing
flows received. Second, errors exist and are ignored in the section of the payload describing
flows sent. Third, errors exist and are ignored in the frame check sequence. Given these
cases, there is only one situation given a worm attack and one situation given a DDoS attack
that could affect the SGCDC system. Should a worm attack exist in the network, if one of
the offspring nodes is altered in the payload and that offspring is the second infected node,
then the system will not detect the worm attack. Should a DDoS attack exist in the network,
if one or more of the attacking nodes is altered in the payload, then the system will detect
the attack but the response mechanism will produce countermeasures against the wrong
node(s).
If the proposed SGCDC system is initialized to distrust the data, then two cases exist with
respect dropped data given a worm attack exists in the network depicted in Figure 5.4.
First, the flows of the infected node and all of the flows of its offspring are not trusted and
discarded. Consequently, the SGCDC system is unable to detect the infected node. Second,
the flows of the infected node and some of the flows of its offspring are not trusted and
dropped. For this case, the ability of the SGCDC system to detect the infected node is the
same as the third worm and DDoS cases for the network in Figure 5.3 (system receiving
only a portion of the traffic flows). In other words, attack detection is dependent on the
number of node flows that are discarded. This requires further analysis on the effects of
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adjacency matrix perturbation on the dual basis.
If the proposed SGCDC system is initialized to distrust the data, then two cases exist with
respect dropped data given a DDoS attack exists in the network depicted in Figure 5.4.
First, the flows of the attacked node and all of the flows of its attackers are not trusted and
dropped. As a result, the SGCDC system fails to detect the attacked node. Second, the flows
of the attacked node and some of the flows of its attackers are not trusted and discarded.
Given this scenario, the ability of the SGCDC system to detect the infected node is the same
as the third worm and DDoS cases for the network in Figure 5.3 (system receiving only a
portion of the traffic flows); attack detection is dependent on the number of node flows that
are disregarded and requires further analysis on the effects of adjacency matrix perturbation
on the dual-basis.
In summary, the only case across all three network noise/congestion scenarios that requires
further analysis is when a certain number of flows of an individual node are perturbed in
the adjacency matrix. The effects of this specific matrix perturbation on the spectral graph
detection mechanism are unclear. The remaining sections in this chapter are dedicated to
analyzing this perturbation in order to determine the impact on the SGCDC system.
5.2 Eigenvalues of Perturbed Adjacency Matrix
In support of the network case that requires further analysis, we focus in this section on the
Δ_ 9 (defined in Equation 2.19) that results from the links associated with one node being
perturbed in the adjacency matrix. We begin by developing a theoretical upper bound of
Δ_ 9 for  = using Weyl’s theorem. Next, we analyze the accuracy of the upper bound by
simulating link removals for one node within  =. We conclude this section by removing the
 = constraint and comparing the upper bound of Δ_ 9 for  = to the simulation results of
Δ_ 9 for simple graphs.
5.2.1 Theoretical Upper Bound for Complete Graphs
The theoretical upper bound of Δ_ 9 for  = is determined from the eigenvalue stability
inequality defined in Theorem 1 in Chapter 2. In support of the network case requiring
further analysis, we assume that the link perturbation in the adjacency matrix is confined
to a single node. If the number of link perturbations ;?4ACDA1 is equal to = − 1 (i.e., all links
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for one node are disconnected), &4AA>A is a = × = star graph (=, which has _ = 0 with a
multiplicity of one, _ = 1 with a multiplicity of = − 2, and _ = = with multiplicity of
one [101]. As a result, we have
_<0G((=) = ;?4ACDA1 + 1, (5.1)
where _<0G is defined in Equation 2.22. If 1 < ;?4ACDA1 < = − 1 (i.e., some of the links for
one node are disconnected)&4AA>A results in a =×= error star graph (4AA>A= where the number
of links in the star is equal to ;?4ACDA1. The (4AA>A= has _ = 0 with a multiplicity of = − 1 and
_ = ;?4ACDA1 with a multiplicity of one [101]. As a result, we have
_<0G((4AA>A= ) = ;?4ACDA1 . (5.2)
If ;?4ACDA1 = 1 (i.e., only one link is disconnected) &4AA>A is a = × = error path graph %4AA>A=
where only one path exists between two nodes. For a path graph %= [101], we have






resulting in _<0G = ;?4ACDA1. Given _<0G(%4AA>A= ) ≤ _<0G(%=), then
_<0G(%4AA>A= ) ≤ ;?4ACDA1 . (5.4)
Given equations 5.1, 5.2, and 5.4, the upper bound of Δ_ 9 for  = is defined as
Δ_*9 = ;?4ACDA1 + 1. (5.5)
This implies a linear relationship between Δ_ 9 and the number of ;?4ACDA1 in the adjacency
matrix of  =.
5.2.2 Simulation Results for  =
The accuracy of Equation 5.5 is analyzed by simulating link removals from one node of  =
for various = between five and 500. The results of  10 and  25 are shown in Figure 5.5,
where the blue asterisks are the data results from the simulation, the green dashed line is
Δ_*
9
, and the red dashed line is the equation Δ_ 9 = ;?4ACDA1. The simulation results for all
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evaluated = including those shown in Figure 5.5 produce a Δ_ 9 < Δ_*9 .
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(a) Link removals from one node in  10
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(b) Link removals from one node in  25
Figure 5.5. Comparison of Δ_*
9
to the Δ_ 9 results from  10 and  25, where
links are removed from a single node.
From these results, the theoretical Δ_*
9
, defined in Equation 5.5, is validated as an upper
bound; however, the results also suggest that a more accurate (i.e., tighter-fit) upper bound




= ;?4ACDA1 . (5.6)
Additional research needs to be conducted to validate Equation 5.6, which is outside the
scope of this dissertation.
81
5.2.3 Simulation Results for Simple Graphs
The accuracy of Equation 5.5 as an upper bound for Δ_ 9 in simple graphs is analyzed
by simulating link removals from one node in a variety of graphs with different levels
of connectivity. For each simulation, 300 random simple graphs containing 50 nodes are
formed using a static probability of link connection %(;8, 9 ) between each pair of nodes,
one node in each graph is selected and edited to be completely connected (i.e., have links
connecting it to every other node in the network), and Δ_ 9 is evaluated as the links of the
selected node are disconnected. Simulation results are obtained for %(;8, 9 ) between 0.01 and
0.99.
To demonstrate the effects of connectivity on Δ_ 9 , the results of %(;8, 9 ) = 0.1 and %(;8, 9 ) =
0.5 are shown in Figure 5.6, and the results of %(;8, 9 ) = 0.75 and %(;8, 9 ) = 0.99 are shown in
Figure 5.7. In figures 5.6 and 5.7, the blue asterisks are the data results from the simulation,
the green dashed line is Δ_*
9
, and the red dashed line is Δ_*,B8<
9
. Additional results for
other %(;8, 9 ) can be found in Appendix B.2.
From the simulation results, Δ_ 9 is impacted differently depending on the connectivity
of the simple graph. In general, graphs that are sparsely connected or densely connected
have a Δ_ 9 close to Δ_*9 for all ;?4ACDA1. Graphs that are neither sparsely nor densely
connected have a Δ_ 9 close to Δ_*9 only for small ;?4ACDA1 and a Δ_ 9  Δ_*9 for large
;?4ACDA1. This means Δ_ 9 ≈ Δ_*9 for very small perturbations in the adjacency matrix of all
simple graphs, but Δ_ 9 is dependent upon the connectivity of the graph for any other size
perturbation. Regardless, the results validateΔ_*
9
for perturbations in the adjacencymatrix
of simple graphs. It is important to also note that the majority of the simple graph results
validate Δ_*,B8<
9
, but the results for %(;8, 9 ) = 0.99 do not validate Δ_*,B8<9 . Additional
research needs to be conducted to determine the specific cases for which Δ_*,B8<
9
is not
valid, which is outside the scope of this dissertation.
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(a) Δ_ 9 from graphs with %(;8, 9 ) = 0.1
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(b) Δ_ 9 from graphs with %(;8, 9 ) = 0.5
Figure 5.6. Comparison of Δ_*
9
to the Δ_ 9 results from a simulation of 300
random simple graphs containing 50 nodes and %(;8, 9 ) = {0.1, 0.5} where
links are removed from a single, fully-connected node.
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(a) Δ_ 9 from graphs with %(;8, 9 ) = 0.75
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(b) Δ_ 9 from graphs with %(;8, 9 ) = 0.99
Figure 5.7. Comparison of Δ_*
9
to the Δ_ 9 results from a simulation of 300
random simple graphs containing 50 nodes and %(;8, 9 ) = {0.75, 0.99} where
links are removed from a single, fully-connected node.
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5.3 Eigenvectors of Perturbed Adjacency Matrix
Continuing to support the network case requiring further analysis, we focus in this section
on the change in { 9 resulting from the links associated with one node being perturbed in the
adjacency matrix. We begin by developing a theoretical upper bound on \ 9 using the Davis-
Kahan theorem. We then use known properties of { 9 to develop a theoretical upper bound
on the change in the magnitude of the eigenvector element Δ |{8, 9 |. Network simulations are
utilized to analyze and validate the magnitude bound for graphs with various degrees of
connectivity. We conclude with a description of a novel application of the =-dimensional
Euclidean distance formula that provides an upper bound on the eigenvector distance { 9 ,
where { 9 is the Euclidean distance between { 9 and {̂ 9 . Network simulations are utilized to
analyze and validate the distance bound for graphs with various degrees of connectivity.
5.3.1 Bounding the Eigenvector Rotation
The theoretical upper bound of \ 9 is determined from the Davis-Kahan theorem (defined in
Theorem2 inChapter 2), which is dependent on | |&4AA>A | | and the perturbed and unperturbed
eigenvalues. In support of the network case requiring further analysis, we assume that link
perturbations in the adjacency matrix are confined to a single node. For mathematical
simplicity, we confine our analysis of \ 9 to  = in this section.
For all cases of ;?4ACDA1 in  = [101],
‖ &4AA>A ‖= ;?4ACDA1 + 1. (5.7)
It is difficult to further reduce or extrapolate information from ^ 9 for link removals in  =.






≤ 180 degrees (5.8)
due to the properties of arcsin. It is important to note that the bound of \*
9
≤ 180 degrees
could also be easily determined from the orthonormal property of the eigenvectors of& [55].
Regardless, this information tells us that link perturbations in the adjacencymatrix can result
in an eigenvector rotating into a different eigenspectrum index with a different _ 9 . While
inherently logical, this proves from a nodal basis perspective that the eigenspectrum index
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for which a node has {?A8
8, 9
may shift as a result of link perturbations.
5.3.2 Bounding the Change in Eigenvector Element
The theoretical upper bound of a change in {8, 9 is determined from known properties of
eigenvectors discussed in Chapter 2. We utilize these properties to develop a theoretical
upper bound and then utilize network simulations of link removals to validate the theoretical
bound.
Given the sum of squares property in Equation 2.8, the range of {8, 9 is [-1 1]. As a result,
the upper bound for a change in {8, 9 is given by
Δ{*8, 9 = 2, (5.9)
and the upper bound for a change in |{8, 9 | is given by
Δ |{*8, 9 |= 1. (5.10)
Similar to the eigenvector rotation bound, this eigenvector element bound also proves from
a nodal basis perspective that the eigenspectrum index in which a node has {<0G
8, 9
may shift
as a result of link perturbations.
Since |{8, 9 | is utilized in the proposed SGCDC system, the accuracy of Δ |{*8, 9 | is analyzed
through the simulation of single node link removals in  = and simple graphs. For  =, Δ |{8, 9 |
is analyzed for networks ranging from = = 25 to = = 200 where a single node experiences
link perturbations (i.e., removals). The results for  25 and  50 are shown in Figure 5.8 and
the results of  100 and  200 are shown in Figure 5.9. In both figures, the blue asterisks are
the data results from the simulation and the red dashed line is Δ |{8, 9 |= 1.
For all network sizes evaluated, the simulations results are similar to those shown in figures
5.8 and 5.9. In other words, the Δ |{8, 9 | resulting from link perturbations for a single node
are less than or equal to one for all evaluated  =. These results validate Δ |{*8, 9 | in Equation
5.10 as an upper bound of the eigenvector element change for complete graphs.
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(a) Link removals from one node in  25
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(b) Link removals from one node in  50
Figure 5.8. Comparison of Δ |{*
8, 9
| to the Δ |{8, 9 | simulation results from  25
and  50, where links are removed from a single node.
87
0 20 40 60 80 100
Number of perturbed links (l
perturb


















































(a) Link removals from one node in  100
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(b) Link removals from one node in  200
Figure 5.9. Comparison of Δ |{*
8, 9
| to the Δ |{8, 9 | simulation results from  100
and  200, where links are removed from a single node.
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To further validate the accuracy of Δ |{*
8, 9
| for other types of networks, single node link
removals are analyzed for 300 random simple graphs containing 50 nodes and a static
%(;8, 9 ). In the simulation, one node in each graph is selected and edited to be completely
connected and Δ |{8, 9 | is evaluated as the links of the selected node are disconnected.
Simulations results are obtained for %(;8, 9 ) between 0.01 and 0.99.
To demonstrate the effects of connectivity on Δ |{8, 9 |, the results of %(;8, 9 ) = 0.1 are shown
in Figure 5.10, the results of %(;8, 9 ) = 0.5 and %(;8, 9 ) = 0.75 are shown in Figure 5.11, and
the results of %(;8, 9 ) = 0.99 are shown in Figure 5.12. In all three figures, the blue asterisks
are the data results from the simulation and the red dashed line is Δ |{8, 9 |= 1. Additional
results for other %(;8, 9 ) can be found in Appendix B.3.
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Data for graphs with P(l
i,j
)=0.1
Figure 5.10. Comparison of Δ |{*
8, 9
| to the Δ |{8, 9 | simulation results of 300
random simple graphs containing 50 nodes and %(;8, 9 ) = 0.1 with link re-
movals from a single, fully-connected node.
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(a) Δ |{8, 9 | from graphs with %(;8, 9 ) = 0.5
(b) Δ |{8, 9 | from graphs with %(;8, 9 ) = 0.75
Figure 5.11. Comparison of Δ |{*
8, 9
| to the Δ |{8, 9 | simulation results of 300
random simple graphs containing 50 nodes and %(;8, 9 ) = {0.5, 0.75} with
link removals from a single, fully-connected node.
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Figure 5.12. Comparison of Δ |{*
8, 9
| to the Δ |{8, 9 | simulation results of 300
random simple graphs containing 50 nodes and %(;8, 9 ) = 0.99 with link
removals from a single, fully-connected node.
From the simulation results, Δ |{8, 9 | is impacted differently depending on the connectivity
of the simple graph. In general, graphs that are more sparsely connected have a higher
probability of a smaller Δ |{8, 9 | for all ;?4ACDA1 compared to graphs that are more densely
connected; however, graphs that are very sparsely connected or very densely connected
appear to have a large Δ |{8, 9 |. Still, graphs with all levels of connectivity appear to have a
higher probability of a smaller Δ |{8, 9 | for a small ;?4ACDA1 than a large ;?4ACDA1. This implies
that small perturbations in the adjacency matrix have a higher probability of producing
Δ |{8, 9 | Δ |{*8, 9 |. For larger ;?4ACDA1, Δ |{8, 9 | is directly dependent on the graph connectivity.
Regardless, the majority of sparse graphs have a higher probability across all ;?4ACDA1 to
produce Δ |{8, 9 | Δ |{*8, 9 |.
5.3.3 Bounding the N-dimensional Change in Distance
A novel application of the =-dimensional Euclidean distance formula (defined in [102])
provides information on eigenvector perturbation that is not provided by the Davis-Kahan
theoremor the sumof squares property. This application is of particular interestwhen applied
to the nodal basis because it provides information on the distance and angle of rotation of
the nodal influences of a single node across the eigenspectrum index from a perturbation of
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its links in the adjacency matrix. We begin by defining the (= − 1)-dimensional coordinate
system before determining the upper bound on the distance and angle of rotation. Then, we
utilize simulations to determine that accuracy of the distance upper bound for graphs with
various levels of connectivity.
Given the = − 1 nodal influences associated with _2 to _= for a single node, a depiction of
the (= − 1)-dimensional coordinate system established by the perturbation of {)
9
is shown
in Figure 5.13 where {)
9
is the eigenvector of the nodal basis associated with node 9 , {̂)
9
is









Figure 5.13. (=−1)-dimensional coordinate system for eigenvector perturba-
tion in the nodal basis.
Given the =-dimensional Euclidean distance formula in [102] and the (= − 1)-dimensional





( ˆ{8, 9) − {)8, 9 )2, (5.11)
and \{ 9 is defined as
\{ 9 = arccos
(




Applying logical reasoning, the upper bound on { 9 is given by
*{ 9 = 2 (5.13)
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and the upper bound on \{ 9 can be shown to be
\*{ 9 = 180
◦, (5.14)
as depicted in Figure 5.14 due to the orthonormal properties of eigenvectors and the prop-
erties of arccos. Equation 5.14 does not provide any new information since 180 degrees is
also the maximum upper bound of Equation 5.8 from the Davis-Kahan theorem. As a result,
we only need to use simulation results to validate the accuracy of *{ 9 .
Figure 5.14. Maximum distance and angle of rotation for eigenvector per-
turbation in the nodal basis.
The accuracy of *{ 9 is analyzed through the simulation of single node link removals for  =
and simple graphs. For  =, the maximum { 9 is analyzed for networks ranging from = = 25
to = = 200 where a single node experiences link removals. The results for the maximum
{ 9 for  25 and  50 are shown in Figure 5.15, and the results for  100 and  200 are shown
in Figure 5.16. For both figures, the blue asterisks are the maximum eigenvector distance
change results from the simulation, the red dashed line is { 9 = 2, and the green dashed
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(a) Link removals from one node in  25
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(b) Link removals from one node in  50
Figure 5.15. Comparison of *{ 9 (red dashed line) to the maximum { 9
observed (blue asterisks) in  25 and  50, where links are removed from a
single node.
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(a) Link removals from one node in  100
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(b) Link removals from one node in  200
Figure 5.16. Comparison of *{ 9 (red dashed line) to the maximum { 9
observed (blue asterisks) in  100 and  200, where links are removed from a
single node.
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All simulations of = exhibit similar results as those shown in Figure 5.11. Since{ 9 < *{ 9
for all simulations, the results validate Equation 5.13. Additionally, the simulation results
appear to show that a tighter upper boundmay exist for{ 9 . For =, the simulation-suggested




For simple graphs, 300 random graphs containing 50 nodes are formed using a static %(;8, 9 )
between each pair of nodes, one node in each graph is selected, the selected node is edited
to be completely connected, and the maximum { 9 is evaluated as the links of the selected
node are disconnected. Simulations results are obtained for %(;8, 9 ) between 0.01 and 0.99.
To demonstrate the impact of link perturbations on { 9 , the results of %(;8, 9 ) = 0.1 are
shown in Figure 5.17, the results of %(;8, 9 ) = 0.5 and %(;8, 9 ) = 0.75 are shown in Figure
5.18, and the results of %(;8, 9 ) = 0.99 are shown in Figure 5.19. For all three figures, the
blue asterisks are the maximum eigenvector distance change results from the simulation,
and the red dashed line is *{ 9 , and the green dashed line is 
*,B8<
{ 9 . Additional results for
other %(;8, 9 ) can be found in Appendix B.4.
Figure 5.17. Comparison of *{ 9 (red dashed line) to the maximum { 9
observed (blue asterisks) in 300 random simple graphs containing 50 nodes
and %(;8, 9 ) = 0.1 with link removals from a single, fully-connected node.
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(a) Max {9 from graphs with %(;8, 9 ) = 0.5
(b) Max {9 from graphs with %(;8, 9 ) = 0.75
Figure 5.18. Comparison of *{ 9 (red dashed line) to the maximum { 9
observed (blue asterisks) in 300 random simple graphs containing 50 nodes
and %(;8, 9 ) = {0.5, 0.75} with link removals from a single, fully-connected
node.
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Figure 5.19. Comparison of *{ 9 (red dashed line) to the maximum { 9
observed (blue asterisks) in 300 random simple graphs containing 50 nodes
and %(;8, 9 ) = 0.99 with link removals from a single, fully-connected node.
From the simulation results, the maximum { 9 is impacted differently depending on the
connectivity of the graph. In general, all graphs have a a maximum { 9 close to *{ 9 for
very large ;?4ACDA1, but graphs that are very sparsely or densely connected have a maximum
{ 9 close to *{ 9 for all ;?4ACDA1. On the other hand, graphs that are neither sparsely nor
densely connected have a higher probability of a small maximum { 9 for a small ;?4ACDA1.
This implies that small perturbations in the adjacency matrix have a higher probability
of producing a maximum { 9  *{ 9 if the graph connectivity is not extremely sparse
or dense. Regardless, all simulation results validate *,B8<{ 9 as an upper bound for the
maximum { 9 .
5.4 Perturbation and Spectral Graph Detection
The spectral graph detectionmechanism employed in the proposed SGCDC system analyzes
the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of & (formed by ) and, therefore, is susceptible to link
perturbations as described in Section 5.1. Given the eigenvalue and eigenvector perturbation
results in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 (summarized in Table 5.1), the spectral graph detection
component is examined to determine the effects of link perturbations in  on attack detection.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.4.1 Eigenvalue Perturbations and System Detection
Given the eigenvalue perturbation results described in Section 5.2 (summarized in Table
5.1) and the strong node concept described in Section 3.2.2, the detection capability of
the spectral graph detection mechanism is directly impacted by changes in the eigenvalues
resulting from link perturbations in . Specifically, the degree of the perturbed node, defined
as





is the _ 9 associated with the {?A88, 9 of the node within the
eigenspectrum index.





of the perturbed node and _CℎA4Bℎ is
the _ 9 associated with )484=, then the node will be detected as crossing the eigenspectrum
threshold. Given this case, the spectral graph detection mechanism accurately detects the
attack if the node is under attack and falsely detects an attack if the node is not under attack.
Conversely, if 3̂8 results in _̂?A89 < _CℎA4Bℎ, then the node will not be detected as crossing
the threshold. Given this case, the spectral graph detection mechanism fails to detect the
attack if the node is under attack and correctly classifies the node as acting under normal
conditions if the node is not under attack.
Combining this information with the simulation results summarized in Table 5.1, the impact
of noise or congestion on the ability of the SGCDC system to accurately detect worm and
DDoS attacks is highly dependent upon the level of connectivity of the components within
the TDG. Theoretically, network noise and congestion will have less impact on the ability of
the system to detect an attack in a TDG containing components with medium connectivity
than a TDG containing components with sparse or dense connections.
5.4.2 Eigenvector Perturbations and System Detection
Given the eigenvector perturbation results described in Section 5.3 (summarized in Table
5.1) and the strong node concept described in Section 3.2.2, link perturbations in the
adjacency matrix can impact the ability of the SGCDC system to detect attacks due to
changes in the eigenvectormatrix. Similar to the eigenvalues, 3̂8 directly impacts the location
of {?A8
8, 9
of a node in the eigenspectrum index. If 3̂8 results in a {̂?A88, 9 in a smaller eigenspectrum
index than the eigenspectrum index of)484=, where {̂?A88, 9 is the primary nodal influence of the
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perturbed node, then the node will not be detected as crossing the eigenspectrum threshold.
As a result, the SGCDC system will not detect the node as a parent node of an attack. If
the node is not under attack, then the detection mechanism correctly classifies the nodes as
normal; however, if the node is under attack, then the detection mechanism fails to detect
the attack.
On the other hand, if 3̂8 results in a {̂?A88, 9 in a larger eigenspectrum index than the eigenspec-
trum index of )484=, then the node will be detected as crossing the eigenspectrum threshold.
As a result, the SGCDC system will detect the node as a parent node of an attack. If the
node is under attack, then the system accurately detects the attack; however, if the node is
not under attack, then the system produces a false alarm.
Combining this analysis with the simulation results summarized in Table 5.1, the detection
accuracy of the SGCDC system is impacted by network noise and congestion. The degree
of impact is primarily dependent on the size of the perturbation and the rate of the attack.
In general, small perturbations in the adjacency matrix from network noise or congestion
should not impact the ability of the SGCDC system to detect medium- to fast-spreading





, respectively, small perturbations in the adjacencymatrix
from network noise or congestion will have a significant impact on the ability of the system
to detect the attack.
In summary, this chapter analyzed the impact of network noise and congestion on the
spectral graph detection mechanism employed by the proposed SGCDC system. Network
noise and congestion results in errors in the adjacency matrix, which in turn affects the
ability of the proposed SGCDC system to accurately detect attacks from the eigenvalues
and eigenvectors of the TDG. As a result, network administrators must have an accurate
understanding of noise and congestion within their network to accurately select the set of
external, input parameters that will increase the probability of detection and decrease the
probability of false alarms. The next chapter validates the detection capability and false
alarm rates of the proposed system using multiple datasets.
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In this chapter, we present results that support the analysis conducted in this dissertation
and validate the performance of the proposed SGCDC system. We first demonstrate the
accuracy of the proposed system in detecting worm and DDoS attacks. Then, we present the
system false alarm rates using real-world and synthetic datasets. Finally, we demonstrate
the potential response capability of the proposed system.
6.1 Scan-Based TCP Worm Attack
In this section, we use several different datasets of various computer worms with different
propagation speeds to examine the detection accuracy of the SGCDC system via MATLAB
implementation and simulation. We begin with an evaluation of the implemented system
against two WannaCry worm datasets that exhibit a slower worm propagation speed. Then,
we evaluate the implemented system against a very fast-propagating modeled hit-list worm.
Finally, we evaluate the implemented system against a slow-to-medium propagating Blaster
worm model.
6.1.1 WannaCry Worm
The detection capability of the proposed SGCDC system is evaluated against two Wan-
naCry worm datasets that have slower estimated propagation speeds due to the number of
infectable hosts in the networks. The first dataset combines Stratosphere LabCTU-Malware-
Capture-Botnet-284-1 [103] and CTU-Malware-Capture-Botnet-285-1 [104] WannaCry
worm datasets. For the remainder of this dissertation, we refer to this collated set of data as
the Stratosphere_WC dataset.
CTU-Malware-Capture-Botnet-284-1 provides the traffic captures of host 192.168.1.112,
andCTU-Malware-Capture-Botnet-285-1 provides the traffic captures of host 192.168.1.135.
There is an approximately 10-second timing difference between the two datasets, which is
accounted for in the Stratosphere_WC dataset. Within the data, host 192.168.1.112 infects
host 192.168.1.135 with the WannaCry worm at approximately 470 seconds in CTU-
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Malware-Capture-Botnet-284-1 (approximately 480 seconds in CTU-Malware-Capture-
Botnet-285-1). Host 192.168.1.135 then begins scanning for new victims at approximately
482.03 seconds in CTU-Malware-Capture-Botnet-285-1. The number of SYN scans by host
192.168.1.135 are initially small in quantity, but the quantity increases as time passes. As a
result, we focus on the data between 450 seconds and 515 seconds in the compiled dataset
during our evaluation. The final infection size is two nodes.
We developed the secondWannaCry worm dataset from the NPSWannaCry virtual network
depicted in Figure 6.1, which contains four laptops with the Windows 7 operating system,
five virtual hosts with the Windows 7 operating system, and one virtual Apache web server.
Figure 6.1. Diagram of WannaCry virtual network developed for the
NPS_WC dataset collection with order of infection depicted by the red
numbers.
To acquire data on the WannaCry worm propagation, host 172.16.247.141 is infected with
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theWannaCry worm acquired from [105], and six additional hosts are rapidly infected in the
order depicted in Figure 6.1. For the remainder of this dissertation, we refer to this collection
of data as the NPS_WC dataset. Upon receipt of the worm payload as part of the infection
process, each of the infected hosts attempts to reinfect the other infected hosts for a period
of time; every instance of reinfection resets the WannaCry worm infection for the host.
After the period of reinfections concludes, the infected host reaches out to a domain name
server (DNS). Approximately 25 seconds after the DNS query, the infected host begins the
traditional target search and discovery process for a scan-based TCP worm. As a result, we
estimate the time of infection as the time that the infected host sends the standard query of
“www.ifferfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com” to the DNS server instead of the
time that the host initially received the worm payload.
Table 6.1 contains the approximate infection times for each of the infected hosts relative to
the beginning of the capture along with the time that each host sends its first SYN packet
after sending the DNS query. It is important to note that while host 192.168.0.5 receives the
worm payload in the NPS_WC dataset, it is unable to execute to the point of sending the
DNS query. As a result, host 192.168.0.5 is not included as an infected host in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1. Infection times and post-infection SYN activity of hosts in the
NPS_WC dataset.
Host IP Approx. InfectionTime





96 sec 120.98 sec
192.168.0.8 294 sec 318.469 sec
192.168.0.9 387 sec 411.956 sec
192.168.0.10 159 sec 184.327 sec
192.168.0.11 242 sec 267.384 sec
We evaluate the detection accuracy and timeliness of our proposed solution by setting C;> =
40 seconds to account for longer infection times due to system reboots [106]. The remaining
external, input parameters are selected to account for both slow and fast worm propagation
speeds, alignwith evaluated characteristics of numerous historicalwormattacks, and support
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the required external, input parameter relationships described by equations 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10.
The times for the SGCDC system to detect the infected node from both infection and from
when the node sent its first SYN packet post-infection (i.e., when began exhibiting worm
attack behavior) are provided in Table 6.2 for the Stratophere_WC dataset and Table 6.3 for
the NPS_WC dataset.








Time to Detect SYNs Sent
Prior to DetectionFrom Infection From 1BC SYN
1 40 5 8.31 sec 6.16 sec 15
2 40 5 6.31 sec 4.16 sec 9
3 40 5 4.31 sec 2.16 sec 5
4 40 5 4.31 sec 2.16 sec 5







From Infection From 1BC SYN
172.16.247.144
0.5 40 5 25.5 sec 0.52 sec
1 40 5 25.5 sec 0.52 sec
2 40 5 26 sec 1.02 sec
192.168.0.8
0.5 40 5 24.75 0.281
1 40 5 25 0.531
2 40 5 25 0.531
192.168.0.9
0.5 40 5 25.75 0.794
1 40 5 25.5 0.544
2 40 5 26 1.044
192.168.0.10
0.5 40 5 26 0.673
1 40 5 26 0.673
2 40 5 26 0.673
192.168.0.11
0.5 40 5 26 0.616
1 40 5 26.5 1.116
2 40 5 27 1.616
106
The SGCDC system had a worm detection and classification rate of one and a worm false
alarm rate of zero for all sets of external, input parameters for both the Stratoshphere_WC
dataset and the NPS_WC dataset. For the NPS_WC dataset, the SGCDC system detected all
infected nodes in less than two seconds after the node began exhibitingworm attack behavior
with the vast majority detected in less than one second. The SGCDC system detected the
infected nodes more slowly for the Stratosphere_WC dataset due to the initially slow scan
rate of the newly infected node. This indicates that the SGCDC system performs better with
a longer !| when a slower ramp up in worm scan behavior occurs post infection, and better
with a shorter !| when a quicker ramp up in worm scan behavior occurs post infection. In
both cases, the SGCDC system accurately detected all of the infected nodes once they begin
exhibiting worm scan behavior.
6.1.2 Hit-List Worm
The detection capability of the proposed SGCDC system is evaluated against a dataset
produced by a modeled hit-list worm (discussed in Section 2.3.1) using MATLAB to
determine the system performance against a worm with a faster propagation speed. Using
various 'B20= and C8= 5 42C , the modeled hit-list worm sequentially infects 512 specified nodes
from the NPS2013 dataset. Once the last node on the hit-list is infected, all of the infected
nodes cease scanning activity. The worm traffic is then spliced into the first four seconds
of the NPS2013 dataset to produce the a dataset containing traffic from a hit-list worm. We
refer to this dataset as the NPS_hit-list dataset for the remainder of this dissertation.
Within the NPS_hit-list dataset, the infected nodes send a different total number of SYN
packets depending on when they are infected. As shown in Table 6.4, the vast majority of
infected nodes send a minimal number of SYN packets after infection while a minority of
the infected nodes send the majority of the SYN packets. In fact, 419 of the 512 nodes send
fewer than five SYN packets.
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Table 6.4. Number of the infected nodes that sent a specific number of SYN
packets in the NPS_hit-list dataset.














To comparatively evaluate the detection accuracy and timeliness of the proposed system
against the faster-spreading worm, the C;> and )|>A<?ℎ0=C>< that is utilized for the Strato-
sphere_WC and NPS_WC datasets is employed for the NPS_hit-list datasets. The detection
results of the implemented system against the NPS_hit-list datasets with a !| = 0.5 seconds
are provided in Table 6.5, !| = 1 second are provided in Table 6.6, and !| = 2 second are
provided in Table 6.7.
The SGCDC system produced a worm detection and classification rate of one and a worm
false alarm rate of zero for all simulated cases except !| = 0.5 sec, 'B20= = 10 packets per
second, and C8= 5 42C = 0.1 second, which produced worm detection, classification, and false
alarm rates of zero. While the SGCDC system was very accurate in detecting the existence
of any attack, the ability of the system to identify the infected nodes was variable across the
!| simulated.
With respect to the accurate identification of infected nodes, the number of identified
infected nodes increased as !| increased. For !| = 0.5, the SGCDC system produced the
least number of identified infected nodes for all worm variations due the smaller amount of
worm traffic that occurs within each window. In other words, as the length of time increased
between SYN packets being sent for infection, the number of SYN packets sent during any

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































It is important to note that while the SGCDC system did not perform as well against this
faster-spreading worm, it still performed better than a traditional packet counting solution.
With )|>A<
?ℎ0=C><
= 5, a traditional packet counting solution would require a node to send five
or more SYN packets to be detected as anomalous. As annotated in Table 6.4, only 16 nodes
send five or more SYN packets in the worm traffic. Yet, the SGCDC system with a !| = 2
seconds identified more than 16 of the infected nodes for all worm variations, a !| = 1
second identified more than 16 of the infected nodes for the majority of the worm variations,
and a !| = 0.5 seconds identified more than 16 of the infected nodes for a couple of the
worm variations.
Comparing the hit-list results to the WannaCry worm results, the SGCDC system produced
relatively similar worm detection and false alarm rates, but our system performed better in
identifying the infected nodes for the slower propagating WannaCry worm. It is important
to note that the hit-list worm model ceased worm traffic once the 512 nodes were infected,
which is atypical of worm propagation. As discussed in Chapter 2, once the hit-list worm
infects the designated nodes on the list, the worm typically resorts back to some other form
of random scanning technique like that utilized by the WannaCry worm. As a result, the
system would begin to produce results similar to those observed from the Stratosphere_WC
and NPS_WC datasets following the completion of the hit-list.
6.1.3 Blaster Worm
The detection capability of the proposed SGCDC system is evaluated against a dataset
produced by a modeled Blaster worm usingMATLAB to determine the system performance
against a worm with a slow-to-medium propagation speed due to a longer infection time.
The modeled Blaster worm utilizes the primary characteristics of the real-world Blaster
worm (described in [106]) with some minor modifications. The resulting worm traffic is
then spliced into the NPS2013 dataset to produce the NPS_blaster datasets. It is important
to note, since the NPS2013 dataset does not contain operating system information and the
Blaster worm model requires operating system information for infection, that the hosts in
the NPS2013 dataset are randomly assigned a Windows XP or Windows 2000 operating
system.
In the Blaster worm model, an initial node is infected at a random time within the first
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detection window of the SGCDC system. The infected node attempts to infect a new node
by generating an IP address. The IP address is generated randomly over the entire IP address
space with a 60 percent probability, and generated in the form of A.B.C.0 with a 40 percent
probability, given A, B, and C are the first, second, and third octets, respectively, of the
infected node IP address. Next, the worm selects the operating system offset it will use for
the exploit; the worm selects theWindows XP exploit with an 80 percent probability and the
Windows 2000 exploit with a 20 percent probability. Using the selected exploit offset, the
worm then attempts to infect 20 sequential nodes by starting with the generated IP address
and incrementing the fourth octet by one. The SYN scans occur at a rate of 100 scans per
second [24], and the infection time takes 36.0058 seconds (approximate time to conduct
the TCP handshake, to send a UDP packet and to reboot the system [106], [107]). Once the
victims are infected, or if the targeted IP address is either non-exploitable or non-responsive,
the worm waits 20 seconds and then generates a new IP address using the rules previously
stated.
To comparatively evaluate the detection accuracy and timeliness of the proposed system
against the Blaster worm, the C;> and )|>A<?ℎ0=C>< that is utilized for the Stratosphere_WC,
NPS_WC dataset, and the NPS_hit-list datasets is employed for the NPS_blaster datasets.
Instead of evaluating the system against all the !| employed in the previous datasets, a
!| = 2 is fixed and the Blaster worm is simulated for 30 trials to determine the performance
against various end infection sizes.
Across the 30 trials, the end infection size ranged from two nodes to 240 nodes. Regardless
of the end infection size, the SGCDC system produced a worm detection and classification
rate of one. Additionally, the system was able to rapidly detect the presence of the worm
after the second node was infected and began exhibiting worm scan behavior as shown in
Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3. In fact, the second infected node was detected within less than
one second after it sent its first SYN packet following infection for all trials.
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Figure 6.2. Amount of time for the SGCDC system to detect the second
infected node in the NPS_blaster datasets from the time the second node
is infected.
0 50 100 150 200 250























Figure 6.3. Amount of time for the SGCDC system to detect the second
infected node in the NPS_blaster datasets from the time the second node
sends the first SYN packet post-infection.
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The SGCDC system also performed well in detecting all subsequently infected nodes in the
simulation, resulting in an infected node detection and classification rate of one across all 30
trials. The amount of time for the SGCDC system to detect each of the subsequent infected
nodes from their first post-infection SYN packet was less than 1.05 seconds across all trials
as depicted in Figure 6.4. In fact, over 96 percent of the infected nodes were detected in less
than one second after they began exhibiting worm infection behavior.
Figure 6.4. Histogram of the amount of time for the SGCDC system to
detect each of the infected nodes from the time the node sends the first
post-infection SYN packet, across 30 trials of the Blaster worm in the
NPS_blaster datasets.
While the SGCDC system produced excellent worm and node detection and classification
rates, it also produced some false alarms for node infections (i.e., identified a node as
infected when not infected). Across the 30 trials, a total of 314 nodes were falsely identified
by the SGCDC as infected during the worm attack. While the SGCDC system produced
less than 25 nodal false alarms in the vast majority of the trials, four trials produced more
than 25 false alarms with one trial producing 34 false alarms as depicted in Figure 6.5. This
number of falsely identified nodes is an arguably acceptable cost given the SGCDC system
correctly identifies all of the nodes that are infected by the worm. This could potentially halt
any further spread of the infection. Nonetheless, further analysis is required to determine
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the root cause of the nodal false alarms to develop a solution to decrease this cost.
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Figure 6.5. Number of nodes falsely detected as infected by the SGCDC
system across 30 trials of the Blaster worm in the NPS_blaster datasets.
Upon further investigation of the source of the false alarms, the nodal false alarms are
produced by under two different cases. First, a false alarm occurred when an infected node
(i.e., parent node) attempted to exploit a host (i.e., offspring) in the network with the wrong
operating system offset, and then that offspring node sent )|>A<
?ℎ0=C><
or more SYN packets
to unique destinations, which occurs with a 0.0012 probability according to Equation A.2,
within one of the following windows while it was stored in the SGCDC system memory.
Second, a false alarm occurred when )484= occupied one of the middle eigenspectrum
indices. From this, we learn that while the strong node concept is strictly upheld by the
principal (e.g., leading and trailing) eigenvalues and eigenvectors, there is some ambiguity
in the very middle eigenspectrum indices. As a result, the SGCDC system might not be as
accurate when the infection begins to grow in size. This requires additional investigation
and is outside the scope of this dissertation.
Comparing the Blaster worm results to the WannaCry worm and hit-list worm results, the
SGCDC system produced relatively similar worm detection and classification rates for the
worm attacks, but the increased infection size of the Blaster worm revealed an underlying
occurrence of increased nodal false alarms by the SGCDC system as the worm infection
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spreads. If the identification of an infected node results in the removal of the node from the
network until it is assessed, the network incurs an additional node unavailability cost up to
approximately 2.5 percent for nodes that are falsely identified as infected. This is arguably
an acceptable cost if it means the SGCDC system accurately identifies and removes all of
the infected nodes from the network prior to further infection spread. In other words, the
network could see a significantly larger number of unavailable nodes if the worm were to
continue to rapidly spread and infect additional hosts. It is also important to note that this
2.5 percent unavailability cost assumes that no action is taken until the end of the simulation
since no response mechanism was employed during these 30 trials; the unavailability cost
theoretically drops closer to zero if the responsemechanism removes the infected nodes from
the network immediately upon detection and classification. Overall, the SGCDC system has
reasonable performance results in detecting a variety of worm attacks.
6.2 SYN-flood DDoS Attack
In this section, we use the DARPA2009 dataset to examine the detection accuracy of the
SGCDC system via MATLAB implementation and simulation against a SYN flood DDoS
attack. As discussed in Section 4.3.4, the DARPA2009 dataset contains synthesized network
traffic between a “/16” subnet (172.28.0.0/16) and the Internet. While a SYN flood DDoS
attack exists within the traffic, the exact start time and all attacking nodes are not known. It
is estimated that approximately 100 different hosts contribute to the attack, most of which
contribute stealthily, but only hosts 19.202.221.71, 19.202.221.72, and 19.202.221.73 are
specifically identified by the owners of the dataset as known attackers with significant
contribution to the attack. Host 172.28.4.7 is identified as the victim of the attack [99].
While we estimate the DDoS attack to start sometime between 90 and 100 seconds in the
dataset (from brief visual analysis of .pcap data), the known hosts do not begin contributing
to the attack until around 114 seconds. The specific times of the first SYN for each of the
three known attacking hosts are listed in Table 6.8.
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Table 6.8. Start of SYN flood attack times for known attacking nodes in
DARPA2009 dataset.




To evaluate the accuracy and timeliness of the proposed system against a DDoS attack, we
set )|>A<
?ℎ0=C><
= 15 to account for Equation 4.3 and evaluated characteristics of numerous
historical DDoS attacks. We then evaluate the SGCDC system using the same !| utilized in
the worm attack simulations. The detection times and detected attacked node by the SGCDC
system are listed in Table 6.9 for the various !|. For all !|, the known attacking hosts are
detected and correctly classified approximately 0.265 seconds after host 19.202.221.72 sent
its first attacking SYN packet.
Table 6.9. Detection times and detected attacked nodes by the SGCDC





(sec) Attacker Detected Victim
Detection Time
(sec)
0.5 19.202.221.71 172.28.4.7 115
1 19.202.221.72 172.28.4.7 115
2 19.202.221.73 172.28.4.7 115
It is important to note that the SGCDC system detected and classified additional nodes in
the DARPA2009 dataset, but unfortunately those nodes cannot be validated since only three
of the approximately 100 attacking nodes have been specifically identified by the owners
of the dataset as attackers. For !| = 2 seconds, the SGCDC detected and classified 28
attacking nodes prior to the time in which host 19.202.221.72 sends its first attacking SYN.
Additionally, 33 nodes other than the three known attacking nodes were detected during the
window in which the three known attacking nodes were detected. For !| = 0.5 and !| = 1
seconds, the SGCDC detected and classified zero attacking nodes prior to the time in which
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host 19.202.221.72 sends its first attacking SYN. The system also detected 16 nodes other
than the three known attacking nodes during the window in which the three known attacking
nodes were detected. From this, we conclude that the SGCDC system requires a longer !|
to detect stealthier attacks and a shorter !| to detect more overt attacks. Still, a longer !|
increases the theoretical system false alarm rate (see Section 4.1), which might explain the
additional nodes detected by the !| = 2 seconds during the window in which the three
known attackers are detected.
Overall, the SGCDCsystemperformedwell in detecting theDDoS attack in theDARPA2009
dataset. Similar to the detection performance of the proposed system against worm attacks,
the system produced a detection and classification rate of one for all evaluated sets of
external, input parameters.
6.3 False Alarm Rates
In this section, we use portions of the DARPA2009, NPS2013, and MAWI2015 datasets
that contain normal network traffic to examine the false alarm rates of the SGCDC system




values utilized in this dissertation, each dataset is evaluated for worm false
alarms independent of DDoS false alarms. In accordance with Sections 6.1 and 6.2, we set





values that align with evaluated characteristics of numerous
historical attacks and support the required external, input parameter relationships described
by equations 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10.
For the DARPA2009 dataset, we evaluated the worm false alarm rates of the SGCDC system
for all combinations of )|>A<
?ℎ0=C><
= {2, 5, 10} and !| = {0.5, 1, 2, 3} and DDoS false alarm
rates for all combinations of )>(
?ℎ0=C><
= {10, 15, 30} and !| = {0.5, 1, 2, 3}. For all
combinations, both the worm false alarm rate and DDoS false alarm rate was zero. These
results were expected due to the relatively small amount of traffic that was synthetically
119
generated across the nodes.
For the NPS2013 dataset, we evaluate the worm false alarm rates of the SGCDC system
for all combinations of )|>A<
?ℎ0=C><
= {2, 5, 10} and !| = {0.5, 1, 2, 3} and DDoS false alarm
rates for all combinations of )>(
?ℎ0=C><
= {10, 15, 30} and !| = {0.5, 1, 2, 3}. The SGCDC
system worm false alarm rates are shown in Figure 6.6a and DDoS false alarm rates are
shown in Figure 6.6b. In general, the false alarm rate increased as !| increased, and the false




increased. As expected, the largest false alarm
rate for both worm and DDoS occurred when the smallest threshold value was combined
with the largest !|. It is also important to note that a !| > 1 second provided DDoS false
alarm rates that are too high to be usable in a real-world system.











































(a) Worm false alarm rates












































(b) DDoS false alarm rates
Figure 6.6. Worm and DDoS false alarm rates of the SGCDC system in the
NPS2013 dataset for various )?ℎ0=C>< and a C;> = 40 seconds.
To compare these observed results to the theoretical system false alarm rate from Equation
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4.18, the worm false alarm rate for !| = 1 and )|>A<?ℎ0=C>< = 5 was combined with the
DDoS false alarm rate for !| = 1 and )>(?ℎ0=C>< = 15. The observed worm false alarm rate
was approximately 0.00013, and the observed DDoS false alarm rate was approximately
0.00194, resulting in an observed system false alarm rate of approximately 0.0021. This
rate falls approximately halfway between the theoretical most-likely system false alarm rate
of 0.00012 and the theoretical system false alarm upper bound rate of 0.00417. To add
further analysis, this set of external, input parameters also produced a worm detection and
classification rate of one for the Stratosphere_WC dataset, NPS_WC dataset, NPS_hitlist
dataset, and NPS_blaster dataset, and a DDoS detection and classification rate of one for
the DARPA2009 dataset.
For the MAWI2015 dataset, we only utilize the first five seconds due to the network size
(20,820 nodes) and volume of traffic across the nodes. The SGCDC system worm false
alarm rates were evaluated for !| = {0.5, 1, 2} with a )|>A<?ℎ0=C>< = {5, 10}. The SGCDC
system produced a worm false alarm rate of zero across all !|. The system DDoS false
alarm rates are evaluated for all combinations of )>(
?ℎ0=C><
= {15, 30} and !| = {0.5, 1, 2}.
The DDoS false alarm rates produced by the SGCDC system are provided in Table 6.10.
While we expected the DDoS false alarm rates to be slightly skewed due to the small number
of windows being analyzed and due to results shown in figures 4.7 and 4.8 (see Section
4.3.4), the observed false alarm rates were extremely high. These large false alarm rates
indicate that modifications would need to be made to the SGCDC system in order to produce
a solution that is viable for large real-world networks.













One solution to counter the extremely large false alarm rates is to significantly decrease the
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!| or significantly increase the )>(?ℎ0=C><. This solution would be easy to implement and
would theoretically decrease the false alarm rate; however, it might also negatively affect
the detection rates.
Upon further investigation of the false alarms, there was a lack of uniformity in SYN traffic
across the nodes in the network that produced the MAWI2015 dataset. Some nodes were
more active and regularly sent a significantly greater number of SYN packets compared to
other nodes in the network. Equation 4.17 assumes a uniform probability of nodes sending
and/or receiving SYN packets, which is clearly not the case for this network. Given a
network with non-uniform nodal SYN traffic, the better solution would be establishing
multiple )>(
484=
in the eigenspectrum index. While this would require additional baseline
knowledge of nodal SYN traffic (e.g., baseline of SYN traffic for different node functions
or identification of nodes that regularly send a larger amount of SYN traffic), it would
theoretically decrease the false alarm rate while maintaining a high detection rate. Due to
time constraints, we were unable to explore this solution; additional research needs to be
conducted to determine the degree to which the false alarm rates could be decreased using
this solution.
In summary, the SGCDC system produces low false alarm rates in smaller networks that
have uniform SYN traffic across the nodes but produces extremely large DDoS false alarm
rates in larger networks that contain disparate nodal SYN traffic.
6.4 System Response
In this section, we use epidemic modeling to evaluate the system countermeasure response
given the detection rates determined in Section 6.1. For defensive countermeasures, there are
two fundamentally different approaches to thwarting cyber attacks: reactive and proactive.
Each defensive countermeasure provides some degree of mitigation to the overall spread
of the attack; however, each countermeasure also has some associated cost (i.e., system
downtime, network delays, resource consumption, etc.) [77]. Since the response component
of the proposed SGCDC system is reactive, we analyze the system response by implement-
ing a packet blocking countermeasure in the SGCDC system response component. This
countermeasure, similar to the packet filtering response in [77], drops all incoming and
outgoing packets of an attacked node. In essence, the packet blocking response removes the
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node from the network which in turn nullifies the DDoS attack or prevents further spread
of the worm attack. As a result, the SIR model (see Chapter 2) is employed to evaluate this
countermeasure response against slow- and fast-propagating worm attacks. To simulate the
SIR system described by the set of deterministic equations in Equation 2.23, we utilize the
Runge-Kutta fourth-order method in MATLAB to account for the iterative process.
6.4.1 Slow-Propagating Worm
The SIR system is evaluated with and without the deployment of the packet blocking
response for a slow-spreading worm attack. For both simulations, #C>C = 2000, (C>C = 1998,
C>C = 2, and 'C>C = 0 to account for the inability of the SGCDC system to detect the worm
attack until the second node is infected. We also utilize attack parameters gleaned from the
NPS_blaster dataset for both simulations.
Across the 30 one-hour trials in Section 6.1.3, the average propagation rate is estimated to be
0.0147 nodes per second, resulting in 1 = 0.0147/#C>C . The rate that the nodes are removed
from the network : is dependent on the deployment of the packet blocking countermeasure.
For the system that does not deploy the packet blocking countermeasure, : = 0. For the
system that deploys the packet blocking countermeasure, we assume that the time between
detection and response is negligible and set : = 1 to correspond with the SGCDC detection
results from the Blaster worm simulations. The resulting dynamical behavior of the network
for the slow-spreading worm, with and without countermeasure response, is shown in Figure
6.7.
For the simulation without countermeasure, the number of infected nodes slowly grows
over time and heads toward an epidemic equilibrium. This makes sense given '0 ≥ 1.
For the simulation with countermeasure employment, the SGCDC system quickly detects
and identifies the infected nodes and removes their traffic from the network, resulting in
the elimination of the attack. Overall, the detection and classification capabilities of the
SGCDC system allowed for a network response that could potentially stop a slow-spreading
worm attack before it gains traction.
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(a) Dynamical behavior without countermeasure






















(b) Dynamical behavior with countermeasure
Figure 6.7. Dynamical behavior of a network experiencing a slow-propagating
worm attack with 1 = 0.0147/#C>C and: a) no deployment of countermea-
sures by SGCDC system resulting in : = 0, and b) deployment of packet
blocking countermeasure by SGCDC system resulting in : = 1.
6.4.2 Fast-Propagating Worm
The SIR system is evaluated with and without the deployment of the packet blocking
response for a fast-spreading worm attack. We assume that the worm has a hit-list of 512
nodes and then transitions to a random scanning technique similar to the WannaCry worm.
As a result, #C>C = 2000, ( = 1488,  = 512, and ' = 0 for both simulations to account for
the extremely fast infection of the 512 nodes on the hit-list. We also utilize attack parameters
gleaned from the NPS_WC dataset for both simulations.
For both simulations, 1 = 0.0137/#C>C since the average propagation rate is estimated to
be approximately 0.0137 nodes per second from analysis of the detection times in Table
6.1. To simulate the SGCDC system without countermeasure deployment, : = 0. On the
other hand, for the simulation of the SGCDC system with countermeasure deployment,
we assume the time between detection and response is negligible and set : = 0.519 to
correspond with the average SGCDC detection results from both the hit-list and WannaCry
worm simulations. The resulting behavioral dynamics of the network for the fast-spreading
worm with and without countermeasure response, is shown in Figure 6.8.
For a fast-spreading worm attack like the hit-list worm, the SGCDC system has a very
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(a) Dynamical behavior without countermeasure






















(b) Dynamical behavior with countermeasure
Figure 6.8. Dynamical behavior of a network experiencing a fast-propagating
worm attack with 1 = 0.0137/#C>C and: a) no deployment of countermea-
sures by SGCDC system resulting in : = 0, and b) deployment of packet
blocking countermeasure by SGCDC system resulting in : = 0.519.
low nodal detection rate during the hit-list period resulting in an initially large infected
set of nodes. While the SGCDC system is capable of identifying the infected nodes (see
Section 6.1), the number of infected nodes continued to rapidly grow and head toward on
epidemic if the system does not deploy countermeasures against the attack. Thismakes sense
given '0 ≥ 1. On the other hand, for the SGCDC system that deployed a countermeasure
response, the initially infected nodes were quickly removed from the network after the
worm transitioned from hit-list to traditional random scanning techniques, resulting in the
elimination of the attack.
Similar to the response results for the slow-propagating worm, the detection and classifica-
tion capabilities of the SGCDC system allowed for network responses that can potentially
stop a worm attack even after it gains initially gains some traction. Still, the response com-
ponent of the SGCDC system is directly tied to the detection and classification results. Our
system is unable to accurately identify the infected nodes in the very beginning seconds of
a fast-propagating worm if the infected nodes send a number of SYN packets less than the
phantom component threshold within the specified !|. As a result, the response mechanism
would not be able to isolate those infected nodes from the network and the infection would
continue to spread. As long as the SGCDC has an accurate infected node identification
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rate less than or equal to 1, the worm would continue to spread and infect. This means the
response mechanism performs optimally when the SGCDC has an accurate infected node
identification rate significantly larger than 1.
This chapter has validated the performance of the proposed SGCDC system in accurately
detecting worm and DDoS attacks. The system provides optimal defense against slow-
to medium-spreading worms attacks and overt DDoS attacks but effectively detects and
classifies the existence of all attack types. We also validated the system performance against
normal network traffic and determined that the system has lower false alarm rates for smaller
networks and for networks that have uniform SYN traffic across all nodes. We provided a
potential solution in the form of multiple thresholds in the eigenspectrum index for larger
networks and networks that do not contain uniform SYN traffic across all nodes. Finally, we
validated the system response component given the observed detection rates of the system
and found that the response mechanism is effective in countering an attack in the network.
Overall, the system performs as designed and is adaptable for different size networks and




In this dissertation, we formulated and validated a biological immune system-inspired
SGCDC system using spectral graph theory techniques, such as phantom components, the
strong node concept and the dual-degree matrix, to detect, classify and respond to TCP
scan-based worm attacks and SYN flood DDoS attacks. Using real-time network flows as
the input to the SGCDC system, we identified the five functional components necessary
to detect, classify and respond to such attacks, and provided a detailed explanation of the
processes that occur within each functional component.
We then conducted analysis of the proposed system under both ideal and non-ideal network
conditions. With respect to ideal network conditions, we developed false alarm equations
to predict and assess the performance of the proposed system for different sets of external,
input parameters. We found that the proposed system is more likely to have a near-zero false
alarm rate than a high false alarm rate for the sets of external, input parameters analyzed.
With respect to non-ideal network conditions, we utilized perturbation theorems and a
novel application of the =-dimensional Euclidean distance formula to analyze the effects of
network congestion and noise on the spectral graph detection mechanism. Regarding the
specific network scenario evaluated, we determined that the degree of impact depended on
the amount of link perturbations relative to the rate of the attack.
Finally, we developed a simulation of the proposed SGCDC system and examined its
performance against synthetic and real-world datasets containing both normal and attack
traffic. The results validated the detection, classification, and response mechanisms. First,
the attack datasets were evaluated for detection rate and detection time. The results suggested
that the proposed system provides optimal defense against slow- tomedium-spreading worm
attacks and overt DDoS attacks. Regardless, the system detected the existence of an attack in
all but one of the simulations. Next, the normal traffic datasets were evaluated for false alarm
rates. The results suggested that the system experiences lower false alarm rates for networks
that contain uniform SYN traffic across all nodes. We identified additional practices that
could be implemented to optimize the proposed system performance in networks with
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higher observed false alarm rates, effectively providing flexibility and adaptability of the
SGCDC system. Lastly, the response mechanism was analyzed using a packet blocking
countermeasure and the observed detection rates of the system against the worm attack
datasets. Overall, the results from our simulations support the conclusion that the proposed
SGCDC system quickly and effectively detects, classifies, and responds to worm and DDoS
attacks.
7.1 Contributions
The results of this work have made several novel and notable contributions. Specifically,
this work provides a novel method of spectral graph-based cyber attack detection and
classification using phantom components, the strong node concept, and the dual-degree
matrix. Extensive simulations, including real-world attack data, validate the performance
and flexibility of the proposed system to detect, classify, and respond to a variety of cyber
attacks under different network types. Additionally, this work develops a novel mixture
model to describe network SYN traffic, which led to the derivation of a theoretical upper
bound on system false alarm rates to facilitate system analysis. Finally, this work develops
a novel method of analyzing eigenvector perturbations within the nodal basis of the dual
basis, which provided a basis for theoretical analysis of the system in a network with noise
and/or congestion.
7.1.1 Spectral Graph-Based Cyber Defense Model
The proposed SGCDC system is the first demonstration of a spectral-graph based cyber
system designed to detect, classify, and respond to cyber attacks. Our simulations have vetted
the proposed SGCDC system against multiple attack scenarios to determine the ability of the
system to detect various worm and DDoS attacks. The proposed system accurately detected
the existence of an attack in every simulation except one where the set of external, input
parameters was not optimal for detection. The system also accurately classified the attack




system had a false alarm rate of approximately 0.002 for worm and DDoS attack detection.
Overall, these combined detection and false alarm rates are better than those previously
observed in literature [26], [29], [35] for methods to detect both worm and DoS attacks.
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In addition to overall attack detection, the proposed system was 100 percent accurate
in identifying all attacked nodes for the overt DDoS attack in the DARPA2009 dataset
and the slow- to medium-spreading worm attacks in the Stratosphere_WC, NPS_WC, and
NPS_blaster datasets. Furthermore, the attacked or infected nodes of the simulated DDoS
and worm attacks (excluding the first node of the worm attack) were all identified in less
than 1.6 seconds after it began exhibiting attack behavior in the NPS_WC, NPS_blaster,
and DARPA2009 datasets. In fact, the vast majority of those nodes were identified in less
than one second. With an absence of detection times in literature for methods to detect both
worm and DoS attacks [26], [29], [35], these results provide a new empirical benchmark
for detection.
Due to the variety of attacks simulated, the observed systemperformance, and the fundamen-
tal concept behind the phantom component, it is reasonable to conclude that this system is
theoretically capable of detecting zero-day worm attacks that exhibit traditional scan-based
propagation characteristics, which cannot be claimed in the biological immune system-
inspired cyber defense systems [14], [20], and two out of the three graph theory-based,
and spectral graph theory-based, cyber defense systems [21], [23], reviewed in literature.
For the one graph theory-based cyber defense system capable of detecting zero-day worm
attacks [22], that system is unable to intrinsically identify the nodes involved in the attack
and is limited to detecting worm attacks only.
7.1.2 Spectral Graph Detection and Classification Techniques
The SGCDC system utilizes innovative techniques to perform spectral graph-based detec-
tion and classification of worm and DDoS attacks. The novel graphical attack behavior
representation via phantom components and the newly-defined strong node concept con-
tribute to the development of attack behavior thresholds within the eigenspectrum index of
the dual-basis to detect worm and DDoS attacks. This detection mechanism provides an
original method of not only identifying the existence of an attack, but also intrinsically iden-
tifying the specific attacked node(s), additional nodes involved in the attack, and estimated
attack rates. Combined with the innovative dual-degree matrix for attack classification, the
system produces the necessary information to quickly and effectively respond with network
countermeasures.
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7.1.3 Lévy-Impulse Mixture Model
To facilitate theoretical false alarm rate analysis of the proposed SGCDC system under ideal
network conditions, the novel Lévy-impulse model was developed. Through simulation, we
found that traditional single-distribution models did not accurately describe the SYN traffic
characteristics observed in real-world traffic. We also found that none of the previously
proposed mixture models in literature accurately characterized SYN traffic. Additionally,
we found that traditional truncation methodologies in mixture modeling literature, which
utilize multiple weighted distributions, did not produce the most accurate model for the high
zero-count and heavy tail characteristics of network SYN traffic. Thus, we developed an
unconventional truncation methodology by combining an impulse with a single weighted
distribution. The resulting Lévy-impulse model was shown to accurately characterize net-
work SYN traffic in multiple real-world and synthetic datasets. It also allowed us to derive
false alarm rate upper bounds for the SGCDC system given a set of external, input parame-
ters. As a result, network administrators are able to analyze sets of external, input parameters
to produce a desired level of SGCDC system performance.
7.1.4 Nodal Basis Perturbation Analysis
To facilitate detection analysis of the propose SGCDC system under non-ideal network con-
ditions, we proposed a novel application of the =-dimensional Euclidean distance formula.
This (= − 1)-dimensional space application provided additional information that traditional
perturbation analysis techniques could not provide with respect to the effects of noise or
congestion on the detection mechanism of the proposed SGCDC model. Specifically, we
found that the spectral graph detection component is robust against noise in the adjacency
matrix when the '0CC02:  ;?4ACDA1 or 'B20=  ;?4ACDA1; however, the detection accu-
racy of the spectral graph detection mechanism can be decreased if '0CC02: ≈ ;?4ACDA1 or
'B20= ≈ ;?4ACDA1. In other words, we found that network noise and congestion theoretically
have no impact on the detection capability of the SGCDC for fast scanning worms and large,
overt DDoS attacks.
7.2 Future Work
An expansion of the contributions presented in this dissertation, along with the removal
of certain assumptions and constraints, offer opportunity for future work. Specifically, we
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suggest additional research in four areas: implementation against other cyber attacks, node-
dependent SYN traffic modeling, evaluation of multiple attack-specific thresholds in the
eigenspectrum index, and determining the breakdown point for the strong node concept.
7.2.1 Detection of Other Cyber Attacks
In this work, the detection and classification of cyber attacks was limited to TCP scan-
based worm attacks and SYN flood DDoS attacks. In a realistic application, the SGCDC
system needs to be able to also detect user datagram protocol (UDP) worm attacks and
other types of DDoS attacks. While the UDP worm implementation would take very little
modification, other types of DDoS attacks would require the identification of the attack
behavior to implement the necessary traffic filters.
Additionally, the implementation of the SGCDC system against other forms of cyber attacks
would greatly complement the work in this dissertation. Similar to other types of DDoS
attacks, this would require the identification of the attack behavior to develop the necessary
phantom component and to implement the necessary trafficfilters. This line of research could
be further stretched to produce a modified SGCDC host-based system to other attacks, like
viruses, that may not produce network traffic. In this case, researchers should consider
other mechanisms to describe the phantom component attack behavior, such as assembly
language or machine processes.
7.2.2 Node-Dependent SYN Traffic Modeling
In developing the theoretical upper bounds for the SGCDC system false alarm rate, we
assumed a uniform SYN traffic behavior across all nodes in the network. As a result, we
averaged the SYN traffic behaviors across all the nodes in the NPS2013 dataset to develop
the Lévy-impulse model. Yet, during validation of the proposed system, we observed a
higher than expected false alarm rate within real-world networks and traced the false alarms
back to a lack of uniformity in nodal SYN traffic. Since certain nodal functions can result
in more network SYN traffic, function-dependent SYN traffic models need to be developed
for a variety of network node types in order to provide researchers with a more accurate
assessment of the performance of the proposed system relative to their network.
For research into implementation of the proposed system against other cyber attacks, these
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function-dependent traffic models can be further expanded upon for other network features
that characterize the different attack behaviors. Additionally, it would be interesting to
determine if the proposed Lévy-impulse model accurately describes other network traffic
features and is a better fit for general network feature modeling than those previously
proposed in literature.
7.2.3 Multiple Eigenspectrum Index Thresholds
During the SGCDC system validation, we observed higher than expected false alarm rates
in larger networks and networks that do not have uniform SYN traffic across all nodes in
the network. We proposed the implementation of multiple attack-specific eigenspectrum
index thresholds to decrease the false alarm rate while maintaining a high detection rate.
Due to time constraints, we were unable to investigate this proposed solution. To explore
this concept, nodes within the network would need to be independently analyzed for SYN
traffic behavior to determine baseline normal traffic levels. Then, the nodes would need to





set for each group of nodes. In addition, the SGCDC system would need to be modified to
account for nodes associated to specific thresholds. The resulting research could potentially
provide more flexibility in the implementation SGCDC system across various networks.
7.2.4 Strong Node Concept Breakdown Point
During the SGCDC system validation, we also observed an increase in false alarms when
)484= occupied one of the middle eigenspectrum indices, and we concluded that ambiguity
exists for the strong node concept within the very middle eigenspectrum indices. Additional
research needs to be conducted to analyze the strong node concept in themiddle eigenvectors
in association to both the size of the eigenspectrum index and the number of nodes above
)484=. This would provide more evidence toward the capability of the SGCDC to detect
attacks of various sizes.
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APPENDIX A:
State Model Transition Derivations
In this appendix, we provide the derivation of %(|>A<) associated with the system state
model discussed in Section 4.1 and the derivations of ?1,3, ?1,2, and ?2,1 associated with
the node state model discussed in Section 4.2.
A.1 Probability of Worm Detection
In this section, the probability of worm detection %(|>A<) using the proposed SGCDC
system is derived. In order for worm traffic to be detected, three conditions must be met: 1)
node  sends a number of SYN packets greater than or equal to )|>A<
?ℎ0=C><
, 2) node  receives
one of those SYN packets sent by node , and 3) node  sends a number of SYN packets
greater than or equal to )|>A<
?ℎ0=C><
while it is being stored in system memory as a offspring
of a potential worm attack. As a result, we have







where #B4=38= is potential sending nodes in the network for a given communication,
%((=CG > )|>A<?ℎ0=C><) is the probability that node  is detected as exhibiting worm attack
behavior, %(=(.#
,
) is the probability that node  sends one of the SYN packets to node
, %((=CG > )|>A<?ℎ0=C><) is the probability that node  is detected as exhibiting worm attack
behavior, and,;>43 is the number of windows that an offspring is stored in memory.
Given #C>C0; nodes in the network, the potential number of sending nodes in the network
can be shown to be
#B4=38= = #C>C0; − 1 (A.2)
since one node must be the receiving node of a communication. The probability that a given






































is the worm detection scaling factor defined as
2|>A<34C =




A.2 Probability of Nodal Transitions
In this section, the nodal state transition probabilities ?1,2, ?1,3, and ?2,1 are derived. For
?1,2, a given node =8 becomes a first-level offspring of a potential worm attack if one of the
network sending nodes sends a number of SYN packets greater than or equal to )|>A<
?ℎ0=C><
and =8 is the recipient of one of those SYN packets. Assuming a uniform distribution for
the probability that any two nodes communicate, we have
?1,2 = #B4=38= × %((=8CG > )|>A<?ℎ0=C><) × %(=
(.#
, ). (A.8)









For ?1,3, either a DDoS attack is detected, or the node is detected as a %|1, 9 of a worm attack.
Consequently, we have
?1,3 = %(>() + %(=8 = %|1, 9 ) (A.10)
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where %(=8 = %|1, 9 ) is the probability that a node is detected as a first-level-parent of a worm
attack. In order for =8 to be detected as %|1, 9 , =8 must send a number of SYN packets greater
than or equal to )|>A<
?ℎ0=C><
, and one of the recipients of one of those SYN packets must send a
number of SYN packets greater than or equal to )|>A<
?ℎ0=C><
while it is being stored in system
memory as a offspring of a potential worm attack. As a result, it can be shown that










?ℎ0=C><) ×,;>43 . (A.11)
Substituting equations A.3 and A.5 into Equation A.11, and reducing the results yields
%(=8 = %|1, 9 ) =










Substituting Equation A.12 into Equation A.10 results in
?1,3 = %(>() +










For ?2,1, a node transitions back to the normal state if two conditions are met: 1) the node
does not send a number of SYN packets greater than or equal to )|>A<
?ℎ0=C><
while it is being
stored in system memory as a offspring of a potential worm attack, and 2) the node does not
receive another SYN packet from another node that sends a number of SYN packets greater
than or equal to )|>A<
?ℎ0=C><
while it is being stored in system memory as a offspring of a
potential worm attack. Assuming uniform value of (=CG for all nodes found above )|>A<484=B?024,
we can write









where $A4?40C is the number of repeated occurrences, defined as
$A4?40C = #B4=38= × %((=8CG > )|>A<?ℎ0=C><) ×,;>43 . (A.15)































In this appendix, we provide additional results for simulations conducted in Chapters 4 and
5 in support of analysis of the SGCDC system.
B.1 Theoretical False Alarm Rate




) are provided for various sets of
external, input parameters. The chosen parameter values align with equations 3.8, 3.9, and
3.10, and the evaluated characteristics of historical worm and DDoS attacks. The results for
%(B~B
5 0;B4
) are shown in figures B.1 and B.2. The results for %(=>34
5 0;B4
) are shown in figures















































































Figure B.1. Probability of a given system false alarm rate for various sets




= 30, and the
units of !| and C;> are seconds.
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) results for !| = 2
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) results for !| = 10
Figure B.2. Probability of a given system false alarm rate for various sets of
external, input parameters, given !| = 2 and !| = 10 seconds, and the unit
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) results for !| = 2
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) results for !| = 10
Figure B.4. Probability of a given nodal false alarm rate for various sets of
external, input parameters, given !| = 2 and !| = 10 seconds, and the unit
of C;> is seconds.
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B.2 Eigenvalues of Perturbed Simple Graphs
In this section, additional results for Δ_ 9 in simple graphs are provided for various %(;8, 9 ).
For each simulation, 300 random simple graphs containing 50 nodes are formed using a
static %(;8, 9 ) between each pair of nodes, one node in each graph is selected and edited to
be completely connected (i.e., have links connecting it to every other node in the network),
and Δ_ is evaluated as the links of the selected node are disconnected. The results for
%(;8, 9 ) = 0.01 are shown in Figure B.5 and the results for %(;8, 9 ) = 0.25 and %(;8, 9 ) = 0.9
are shown in Figure B.6 where the blue asterisks are the data results from the simulation,
the green dotted line is Δ_*
9
, and the red dotted line is the equation Δ_ 9 = ;?4ACDA1. See
Section 5.2.3 for additional information.
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Figure B.5. Comparison of Δ_*
9
to the Δ_ 9 simulation results of 300 random
simple graphs containing 50 nodes and %(;8, 9 ) = 0.1 with link removals from
a single, fully-connected node.
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(a) Δ_ 9 from graphs with %(;8, 9 ) = 0.25
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(b) Δ_ 9 from graphs with %(;8, 9 ) = 0.9
Figure B.6. Comparison of Δ_*
9
to the Δ_ 9 simulation results of 300 ran-
dom simple graphs containing 50 nodes and %(;8, 9 ) = {0.25, 0.9} with link
removals from a single, fully-connected node.
142
B.3 Eigenvectors of Perturbed Simple Graphs
In this section, additional results for Δ |{8, 9 | in simple graphs are provided for various %(;8, 9 ).
For each simulation, 300 random simple graphs containing 50 nodes are formed using a
static %(;8, 9 ) between each pair of nodes, one node in each graph is selected and edited to
be completely connected (i.e., have links connecting it to every other node in the network),
and Δ |{8, 9 | is evaluated as the links of the selected node are disconnected. The results for
%(;8, 9 ) = 0.01 are shown in Figure B.7 and the results for %(;8, 9 ) = 0.25 and %(;8, 9 ) = 0.9 are
shown in Figure B.8 where the blue asterisks are the data results from the simulation, and
the red dotted line is Δ |{8, 9 |= 1. See Section 5.3.2 for additional information.
Figure B.7. Comparison of Δ |{*
8, 9
| to the Δ |{8, 9 | simulation results of 300
random simple graphs containing 50 nodes and %(;8, 9 ) = 0.01 with link
removals from a single, fully-connected node.
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(a) Δ |{8, 9 | from graphs with %(;8, 9 ) = 0.25
(b) Δ |{8, 9 | from graphs with %(;8, 9 ) = 0.9
Figure B.8. Comparison of Δ |{*
8, 9
| to the Δ |{8, 9 | simulation results of 300
random simple graphs containing 50 nodes and %(;8, 9 ) = {0.25, 0.9} with
link removals from a single, fully-connected node.
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B.4 Eigenvector Distances of Perturbed Simple Graphs
In this section, additional results for { 9 in simple graphs are provided for various %(;8, 9 ).
For each simulation, 300 random simple graphs containing 50 nodes are formed using a
static %(;8, 9 ) between each pair of nodes, one node in each graph is selected and edited to
be completely connected (i.e., have links connecting it to every other node in the network),
and the maximum { 9 is evaluated as the links of the selected node are disconnected. The
results for %(;8, 9 ) = 0.01, %(;8, 9 ) = 0.25, and %(;8, 9 ) = 0.9 are shown in FigureB.7 where the
blue asterisks are the maximum eigenvector distance change results from the simulation,
and the red dotted line is { 9 = 2, and the green dotted line is { 9 =
√
2. See Section 5.3.3
for additional information.
Figure B.9. Comparison of *{ 9 (red dashed line) to the maximum { 9
observed (blue asterisks) in 300 random simple graphs containing 50 nodes
and %(;8, 9 ) = 0.01 with links removals from a single, fully-connected.
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(a) Max {9 from graphs with %(;8, 9 ) = 0.25
(b) Max {9 from graphs with %(;8, 9 ) = 0.9
Figure B.10. Comparison of *{ 9 (red dashed line) to the maximum { 9
observed (blue asterisks) in 300 random simple graphs containing 50 nodes
and %(;8, 9 ) = {0.25, 0.9} with links removals from a single, fully-connected.
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